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“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows  
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”∗∗ 
I.  UNCONSCIOUS CLASSISM AND ELEVATING THE ENTITY RIGHTS OF 
SOLE PROPRIETORS 
A.  Sole Proprietor’s View of the Firm 
Significant intellectual capital has rightfully been spent on big 
business issues.1  Academic focus on big business issues, as evidenced 
 
 ∗∗ Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (analyzing a black 
man’s constitutional right to equal accommodation on a public railroad).  See generally 
CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE:  A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987) 
(offering a comprehensive perspective on the legal and social context of Plessy and its 
outcome); LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 
(1999) (providing a thorough study of Justice Harlan and his judicial views); David S. 
Bogen, Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy, 52 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2007) (criticizing the 
Court’s true motives in Plessy). 
 1 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (discussing how executives influence 
their compensation by shaping their own pay arrangements); Bernard Black et al., Outside 
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (discussing the role and liability of inde-
pendent directors of public companies); Douglas M. Branson, Enron—When All Systems 
Fail:  Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989 
(2003) (assessing the failed protections in corporate and securities law); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:  Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006) (exploring the nuances of controlling shareholder struc-
tures and the implications of such systems); Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the 
Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006) (providing a nontraditional view of the shielding 
analysis, unveiling the roots of management and controlling-shareholder opportunistic 
behavior towards creditors and non-controlling, minority owners, or what the authors call 
“entity-shielding”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues:  Securi-
ties Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005) (analyzing the challenges 
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in business law casebooks, inadvertently ignores sole proprietorship 
law.2  Sole proprietorship law is also curiously absent from legal re-
statement and codification efforts,3 and from state statutory develo-
ment, reflecting the fact that a sole proprietorship can be created 
without any formality.4  Despite their absence in many corners, sole 
proprietors and the legal complexities they face have recently gained 
 
that securities regulation faces in international market development); Larry E. Ribstein, 
International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley:  Raising the Rent on US Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 
299 (2003) (analyzing how Sarbanes-Oxley makes U.S. corporation law less appealing to 
multinational corporations); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley 
model of corporate governance). 
 2 See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 1–29 (2d ed. 2003) (omit-
ting references to sole proprietorships in discussion of forms of business associations); 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1–2 (9th ed. 2005) (providing two pages on sole proprietorships); 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 2 (2000) (less than one page); WILLIAM A. 
GREGORY & THOMAS R. HURST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 31–34 (2d ed. 
2005) (four pages); WILLIAM A. GREGORY & THOMAS R. HURST, UNINCORPORATED 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS INCLUDING AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES:  CASES AND MATERIALS 833–37 (3th ed. 2006) [hereinafter GREGORY & 
HURST, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS] (five pages); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & 
RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS:  ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS 250–52 (4th ed. 2006) (three pages); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN 
R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 8 (9th ed. 2005) (less than one page); CHARLES R.T. 
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 2, 14–15 (5th ed. 2006) (three pages); DANIEL Q. POSIN, CASES AND 
ANALYSES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES:  A SOCRATIC 
APPROACH (2005) (no pages); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES, NOTES AND QUESTIONS 68 (2005) (one page); ROBERT 
A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 2–3 (2006) (two pages); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. 
LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 5–6, 60 (4th ed. 2003) (three pages); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 10, 524–25 (3d ed. 2004) (three pages); JOEL 
SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1–2, 27–28 (1995) (four pages). 
 3 Restatements and Model Codes exist for all types of business entities except the sole pro-
prietorship.  See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (2001) (outlining basic rules under model 
partnership laws); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) (same); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914) 
(same); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2007) (outlining model corporation laws). 
 4 A terms and connectors search for “sole proprietorship” in the State Statutes database 
(ST-ANN-ALL) on Westlaw shows that there is no state statute expressly enabling the 
creation of a sole proprietorship, although there are some statutory provisions relating to 
sole proprietorships.  See also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY, 
PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 1 (3d ed. 2000) (“A sole proprietorship is a business organization 
that is owned by a single individual, and is not cast in a special legal form of organization, 
such as a corporation, that can be utilized only by filing an organic document with the 
state pursuant to an authorizing statute.”); RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 525 (discussing pos-
sible reasons why there are no statutes covering sole proprietorships); cf. UNIF. LTD. 
P’SHIP ACT (2001) (outlining formal rules for setting up a limited partnership). 
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the attention of some scholars.5  This Article is dedicated to exploring 
the law’s treatment of the unincorporated sole proprietorship,6 espe-
cially as the alter ego of its owner,7 and to facilitating needed reform 
of this important business form. 
Sole proprietorships are vital to both the U.S.8 and world9 econo-
mies and are the most prevalent of all business forms in the United 
States10—as such, they deserve serious scrutiny.  Small business is big 
business; in 2004 alone, the IRS reported that all non-farm sole pro-
 
 5 See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs:  A Limited Liability Sole 
Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 381 (proposing a model limited liabil-
ity sole proprietorship act); Larry E. Ribstein, The Loneliest Number:  The Unincorporated 
Limited Liability Sole Proprietorship, 1 J. ASSET PROTECTION 46 (May/June 1996) (challeng-
ing the denial of limited liability protection to sole proprietors).  See generally ALFRED F. 
CONARD ET AL., AGENCY, ASSOCIATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS:  CASES, 
STATUTES AND ANALYSIS 4–5, 9–10, 17 (4th ed. 1987) (providing background information 
about sole proprietorships); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS:  ESSENTIAL TERMS AND 
CONCEPTS 29–49 (1996) (same); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 5–50 (9th ed. 2004) 
(same). 
 6 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a sole proprietorship as “[a] 
business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in 
his or her personal capacity”); see also HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 29–30 (stating that a 
sole proprietorship, also known as an “unincorporated proprietorship,” is the simplest 
form for operating a business); DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 606 (1992) (defining a sole proprietorship as “a business owned 
by an individual, as distinguished from ownership by a corporation, a partnership, or any 
form of group ownership”).  “An entrepreneur is an owner of a business who is personally 
involved in its management and who shares in its profits or losses.  Entrepreneurship 
combines both ownership and management.”  HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 29–30 (empha-
sis omitted). 
 7 See infra Part II.A. 
 8 See infra Part II.D.  See generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN 
AMERICA (2d ed. 2003) (exploring the long history of small businesses’ contributions to 
the U.S. economy, including sole proprietorships). 
 9 See, e.g., Neil Gregory & Stoyan Tenev, China’s Home-Grown Entrepreneurs, CHINA BUS. REV. 
14 (Jan.-Feb. 2001), available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0101/
gregory.html (discussing the status of the sole proprietorship in China).  In 1998, the 
domestic private sector of China, including sole proprietorships, made up about 27% of 
the nation’s gross domestic product (“GDP”).  Id.; see also NAT’L COMMERCIAL BANK, IPO 
BUSINESS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA 5 (2005), available at http://www.alahli
.com/personalbanking/er2005.asp (discussing the potential of converting sole proprie-
torships in Saudi Arabia into joint stock companies to raise capital through initial public 
offerings).  There are over 80,527 active sole proprietorships in Saudi Arabia.  Id. at 6. 
 10 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/cats/business_enterprise/sole_proprietorships_partnerships_corporations.html 
(follow “Table 721” hyperlink) (reporting that in 2004, there were 20,591,000 non-farm 
proprietorship tax returns filed, compared to 2,547,000 partnership and 5,558,000 corpo-
rate filings).  Indeed, the number of sole proprietorship filings was more than double the 
combined total of both corporate and partnership filings.  See id. 
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prietorships in the United States accounted for $1,140 billion in re-
ceipts and $248 billion in net income.11  The continued vitality of 
small businesses and their contributions to the economy have re-
ceived national attention.12 
When looking closer at these statistics, one discovers two universes 
of sole proprietors.  One universe represents individuals already em-
ployed by other business entities, who operate sole proprietorships as 
an added source of income or as a hobby.13  The other universe 
represents sole proprietors who operate their businesses as the sole 
source of their income.14  Many of these businesses are often family-
run and located in inner-city and rural communities.15  They operate 
their businesses as sole proprietorships despite the availability of legal 
business entities, such as the corporation and the limited liability 
company.16  As a result, sole proprietors fail to participate in what has 
 
 11 Id.  Comparatively, the IRS reported that partnerships accounted for $3,142 billion in 
receipts and $385 billion in net income, while corporations accounted for $21,717 billion 
in receipts and $1,112 billion in net income.  Id.  But see SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (“At 
the same time the vast preponderance of business organizations—over 13.6 million sole 
proprietorships, over 1.6 million partnerships, and over 3.5 million corporations—are not 
on the Fortune 500 list.”). 
 12 See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11. (“To make our econ-
omy stronger and more competitive, America must reward, not punish, the efforts and 
dreams of entrepreneurs. . . . [S]o we must free small businesses from needless regulation 
and protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits.”); see also McRae C. Banks & Stephen 
Taylor, Developing an Entrepreneur- and Small Business Owner-Defined Research Agenda, 29 J. 
SMALL BUS. MGMT. 10 (1991) (summarizing a study on the “needs” and “problems” facing 
entrepeneurs); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insur-
ance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1984) (focusing on tort reform as a means of sup-
porting small business growth). 
 13 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS, http://www.census.gov/csd/
sbo/cbsummaryoffindings.htm (“Forty-two percent of owner-operated firms with no paid 
employees and revenues of less than $5,000 operated their business to supplement their 
income, compared to 7.0 percent of those with revenues of $1,000,000 or more.”). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 10; Deborah L. Murphy, Understanding the Complexities 
of Private Family Firms:  An Empirical Investigation, 18 FAM. BUS. REV. 123, 124 (2005) (un-
dertaking a study to “gain additional insight into the most important issues facing family 
firms”); Melissa Carey Shanker & Joseph H. Astrachan, Myths and Realities:  Family Busi-
nesses’ Contribution to the US Economy—A Framework for Assessing Family Business Statistics, 9 
FAM. BUS. REV. 107, 114–15 (1996) (assessing the contribution of family businesses in the 
United States to GDP and employment).  While a study of sole proprietorship might also 
raise issues of spousal interests, particularly in community-property states, this area is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
 16 See infra Part V; see also JOSEPH SHADE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 47 (2d ed. 
2006) (noting that due to the preventive exposure that the sole proprietorship poses to 
its owners, “there are far more sole proprietorships than there should be” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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been described as “[o]ne of the law’s most economically significant 
contributions to business life.”17  This is what is herein referred to as 
“legal entity status,” or the “creation of fictional but legally recog-
nized entities or ‘persons’ that are treated as having some of the at-
tributes of natural persons.”18  In addition, they are subject to un-
shielded business liabilities.19  This Article is not about liability 
shielding, although the creation of a sole proprietorship as a separate 
legal entity may result in some liability-shielding aspects.  Rather, this 
Article focuses on the “mechanical efficiencies”20 of entity status. 
Why does the law treat unincorporated sole proprietors differently 
than all other business forms?  Does sole proprietorship law dispar-
ately impact business owners who often reside at the bottom rung of 
the socioeconomic ladder?  What does an analysis of the sole proprie-
torship unveil about the true meaning and rise of the firm?  The an-
swers to these questions are viewed from the lens of Critical Class 
Theory and what is referred to here as “unconscious classism.” 
B.  The Lens of Unconscious Classism and Critical Class Theory 
Before outlining the direction of this Article, it is essential to pre-
sent a perspective or lens through which sole proprietorship law will 
be viewed.  Overt racism and sexism have received substantial atten-
tion from constitutional theorists, including the excellent work done 
under Critical Race Theory (“CRT”),21 Critical Feminist Theory 
 
 17 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 15 (1986).  See generally Gregory A. Mark, 
Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1441 (1987) (discussing the development of the corporation as an autonomous legal en-
tity in the American legal system). 
 18 CLARK, supra note 17, at 15. 
 19 See Crusto, supra note 5 (analyzing the issues relative to sole proprietors’ exposure to 
business liabilities and presenting a case for a limited liability sole proprietorship statute). 
 20 CLARK, supra note 17, at 19.  See infra Part II.B. 
 21 See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:  
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) (ar-
guing that anti-racist scholars generally misunderstand the relationship between racial 
and other forms of oppression, and thus help perpetuate heterosexism); Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?:  Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1455 (2002) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blind-
ness?](criticizing “progressive race blindness” theory for failing to embrace race as an im-
portant dimension of identity); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Direc-
tions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 330 (2006) 
(suggesting that CRT should more adequately account for issues of class); Bailey Figler, 
Note, A Vote for Democracy:  Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61 
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(“CFT”),22 and Critical Class Theory (“CCT”).23  In addition to analyz-
ing and remedying overt acts of inequity, constitutional rights theo-
rists have come to recognize the need to expand constitutional rights 
theory beyond overt acts to redress unconscious and institutional 
forms of rights violations.24  This Article seeks to contribute to Poverty 
or Critical Class Theory of constitutional rights by presenting, in part, 
a framework for analyzing social and economic discrepancies by fo-
cusing on the economic infrastructure, class divisions, and institu-
tionalized inequities manifest within the United States. 
CCT continues the work started by CRT and CFT, and in many 
ways is consistent with these theories.  CRT calls for legal discourse 
 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723 (2006) (discussing the problem of unconscious racism in 
felon disenfranchisement). 
 22 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Does Nothing Ever Change; Is Everything New?:  Comments on the “To Do 
Feminist Legal Theory” Symposium, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 415 (2003) (summarizing vari-
ous works of CFT scholarship); Don S. Browning, Linda McClain’s The Place of Families 
and Contemporary Family Law:  A Critique from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2007) 
(proposing a theory of “critical familism” to challenge trends in family law theory); Verna 
L. Williams, Private Choices, Public Consequences:  Public Education Reform and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563 (2006) (discussing public education from a 
CFT perspective). 
 23 See, e.g., EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE:  RACE, GENDER, 
IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2005); MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
SOCIAL JUSTICE:  PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW (2003); Clark Freshman, Fore-
word:  Revisioning the Constellations of Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics, and Empirical 
Scholarship, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2267 (2003) (suggesting an overlap between CRT and em-
pirical studies of inequality); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Dis-
crimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005) (discussing discrimination in employment deci-
sions); Kristin Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women:  
How Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1181 (2006) (arguing that 
feminist legal theory requires broader thinking about matters relating to women’s finan-
cial well-being); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Dispa-
rate Impact Cause of Action:  Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996) (discuss-
ing disparate impact and class theory in the employment context); Rachel Bloomekatz, 
Comment, Rethinking Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-Wage 
Workplace, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1963 (2007) (analyzing the statutory remedies available for 
U.S. workers to challenge employment discrimination in favor of immigrants). 
 24 See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Seeing the Old Lady:  A New Perspective on the Age Old Prob-
lems of Discrimination, Inequality, and Subordination, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 263 (2007) 
(arguing that current laws only address blatant racism and should be further refined); Ian 
F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”:  Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (discussing the history of colorblindness in the context of anti-
discrimination law); Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Af-
firmative Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1931 (2007) (arguing that federal courts treat fed-
eral affirmative action laws more leniently than they do state laws); cf. Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating racial classifica-
tions in public school student assignment plans); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (upholding a public law school’s use of race in admissions decisions to maintain a 
diverse student body). 
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intending to uphold the rights of those who are disadvantaged be-
cause of their race.25  Similarly, CFT focuses on the social impact of 
gender discrimination.26  However, these calls for legal discourse on 
race and gender equality have not reached their potential because 
the economic element of how or why there is racial and gender dis-
crimination is often not addressed.27  CCT hopes that by focusing on 
the economic aspect of discrimination, one might understand that 
various forms of discrimination are a by-product of class-based dis-
tinctions.28  CCT assesses political and economic factors, in addition 
to social factors.  One hopes that through the prism of CCT, various 
aspects of unconscious and/or institutionalized inequities will be re-
dressed, as sometimes inequities result from the mentality of indi-
viduals and the socio-economic impact of their prejudices.29  Through 
the bi-focal lens of “unconscious classism,” combining CCT with re-
cent theories of unconscious adverse behavior, this Article analyzes 
sole proprietorship law as follows. 
C.  Overview of the Article 
Through the lens of unconscious classism, this Article argues that 
sole proprietorship law should be reformed to recognize the sole 
proprietorship as a legal entity, separate from its owner, codifying its 
entity status in a Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act (“USPA”).30  In 
promoting the legal entity nature of the sole proprietorship, this Ar-
ticle seeks to achieve what is hereinafter referred to as “entity equal-
ity,” placing sole proprietors on equal footing with owners of other 
 
 25 See, e.g., Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?, supra note 21, at 1477 (noting that critical 
race theorists and critical legal scholars agree that rights are socially constructed). 
 26 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 22, at 569 (discussing the workings of inner city public 
schools and how educational reform policies appear to condemn poor parents, who are 
often single women). 
 27 See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 21, at 391 (discussing the interrelation between class and race 
in critical race theory). 
 28 Id. at 389. 
 29 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 23, at 744 (explaining that in some contexts, discrimination may 
be the result of individuals making subjective decisions). 
 30 There are, of course, other approaches to remedying the law’s unequal treatment of sole 
proprietors, such as amending the definition of a general partnership to include a one-
person partnership, educating sole proprietors on the benefits of alternative legal forms 
including incorporation and the limited liability company, and/or automatically granting 
a sole proprietor partial entity status upon registering for a business license or a fictitious 
name.  The statutory approach, following the example of the Uniform Partnership Act 
(“UPA”), would arguably result in the widest, most immediate means to redress the entity 
issue.  The author thankfully acknowledges University of Miami Law Professor Caroline 
M. Bradley for raising the question of alternatives to statutory development. 
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business enterprises—partners, shareholders, and limited liability 
members.31 
Some critics will see this as another unwanted development in the 
proliferation of legal entities,32 supporting the call for entity unifica-
tion.33  To the contrary, entity equality is consistent with the views of 
business law scholars who challenge the call for entity rationalization 
or simplification, arguing that form should follow function.34  Most 
importantly, entity equality looks to “considerations of fairness, jus-
tice, or policy.”35 
Part I of this Article demonstrates the need to view the theory of 
the firm from the sole proprietorship perspective and to develop a 
critical class theory of constitutional law, as well as provides the thesis 
and an overview.  Part II demonstrates that the law currently views the 
sole proprietorship solely as the alter ego of its owner (the “solitary 
alter ego” view), how the solitary alter ego view legally disadvantages 
sole proprietorships by treating them as individuals under common 
law principles, and why the solitary alter ego view is antiquated and 
ripe for reform.  Part III analyzes the value of legal entity status, pre-
sents case law examples of the sophisticated nature of and probing 
issues surrounding modern sole proprietorship law, and proposes 
that the sole proprietorship should be treated as a legal entity for 
some purposes, as is the law for all other business forms. 
Part IV argues that current constitutional law principles are in-
adequate to remedy unconscious and institutional classism against 
sole proprietors.  Part V makes the public policy case for expanding 
 
 31 See infra Part II.B (discussing entity status of other legal enterprises).  Also note that an 
alternative to granting entity status to the sole proprietorship is to strip entity status from 
the business enterprises that currently enjoy its benefits, including the corporation. 
 32 See generally Robert W. Hamilton, Entity Proliferation, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 859 (2004) 
(analyzing the pros and cons of the recent growth in the variety of business entities). 
 33 See, e.g., Harry J. Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code:  The Next Generation, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 90–109 (2004) (suggesting the creation of a unified business or-
ganizations code). 
 34 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Form and Function in Business Organizations, 58 BUS. L. 1433, 
1443–48 (2003) (challenging the call for entity rationalization or simplification). 
 35 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 50 (5th ed. 2000).  In 
a critique of corporate law, Hamilton observes that: 
The artificial entity theory has been criticized as being unrealistic and formal-
istic. . . . Professor Hohfeld summarized this view of the corporation in . . . Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions 197 (1923). 
Hohfeld’s analysis illustrates the fallacy of accepting uncritically the “artificial 
entity” theory.  A corporation may be treated as an entity for many purposes but it 
need not be treated as an entity for all purposes. . . . For this reason, arguments 
grounded solely on the artificial entity theory and not supported by considerations 
of fairness, justice, or policy have sometimes not prevailed. 
  Id. at 48–50. 
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constitutional rights theory to redress the law’s unequal treatment of 
sole proprietors.  Part VI discusses the opposition to treating the sole 
proprietorship as a legal entity and shows why the opposition is 
wrong.  Part VII concludes that the law should establish entity equal-
ity for sole proprietors by statutorily granting the sole proprietorship 
legal entity status for some purposes in addition to alter ego status for 
other purposes.  Appendix A is a chart of the current entity features 
of a sole proprietorship compared to those proposed in this Article.  
Appendix B proposes the legal entity status features of a model sole 
proprietorship statute, the Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act 
(“USPA”), following the example of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”).36  And Appen-
dix C is a chart entitled “Distribution of Sole Proprietors and Their 
Gross Receipts by Size of Proprietorship, Tax Year 2003.” 
II.  SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP LAW IS RIPE FOR REVIEW BECAUSE THE LAW 
AND THE SOLITARY ALTER EGO VIEW TREAT THE SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP 
AS INDISTINCT FROM ITS OWNER 
This Part establishes that the law currently defines the sole pro-
prietorship solely as the alter ego of its owner.  It argues that this 
definition legally disadvantages sole proprietors compared to busi-
ness owners who choose other business forms.  It demonstrates that 
sole proprietorship law is currently seen as being indistinct from 
other common law principles.  And it argues that the solitary alter 
ego view is antiquated and ripe for reform. 
A.  The Solitary Alter Ego Theory of Sole Proprietorships 
Under the solitary ego view, a sole proprietorship has no separate 
identity from its owner.37  A sole proprietor is solely entitled to all 
 
 36 NCCUSL’s treatment of the general partnership as a legal entity rather than as an aggre-
gate of partners began in the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) (1914), and reached frui-
tion in its independence of partners in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”) 
(1994).  See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 63 (“Much of the early case law adopted the ag-
gregate theory, but almost all modern cases treat the partnership as a separate legal en-
tity.  UPA (1914) itself contains internal evidence that could be cited to support either 
theory, but section 201 of UPA (1994) squarely adopts the modern entity view by simply 
stating that ‘a partnership is an entity’ independent of its partners.” (footnote omitted)). 
 37 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 39 (“From a legal standpoint, . . . in a proprietorship there 
is no separation between personal and business affairs.”); LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 39 
(6th ed. 2005) (“[T]he legal identity of the sole proprietorship and its owner are one and 
the same . . . .”); The Basics of Sole Proprietorships, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
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profits from the business, subject to the rights of creditors,38 while 
personally liable for all business debts and obligations,39 including all 
contractual debts and all tort liabilities incurred by the sole proprie-
tor, her employees, and other agents in the business’s course.40  The 
profits and losses of the business are reported on the personal in-
come tax return of the owner, although a separate schedule must be 
used.41 
Some courts have added to the solitary ego view in holding that 
any judgment rendered against a sole proprietorship, separate from 
its owner, is void.42  This non-entity view is further illustrated in rul-
ings holding that the proper venue for actions brought against a sole 
proprietorship is the venue where the proprietor is domiciled.43 
B.  The Alter Ego View Legally Disadvantages Sole Proprietors 
The solitary alter ego view hampers the effectiveness of the sole 
proprietorship, making it a legally disadvantaged business form.  
There are “mechanical efficienc[ies]” in “[t]he function of attribut-
ing powers to a fictional legal person.”44  Arguably, mechanical effi-
ciencies result from two and, in some cases, thousands of partners or 
shareholders acting as a single legal entity or person.45  One wonders 
whether the converse is also true—that mechanical efficiencies might 
also result from one person acting as two—which on the surface ap-
pears inefficient and contrary to logic. 
 
startingabusiness/startupbasics/businessstructure/article77798.html (last visited Jan. 15, 
2009) (presenting a simple description of sole proprietorships that assumes a solitary ego 
view). 
 38 1 STEVEN C. ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 3:2, at 2 (2005). 
 39 EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 1. 
 40 See id. at 2. 
 41 1 ALBERTY, supra note 38, § 4:2, at 1–2. 
 42 See, e.g., Patterson v. V & M Auto Body, 589 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 (Ohio 1992) (voiding a 
judgment against an auto body shop because the complaint named a sole proprietor-
ship—“a nonentity”—rather than its proprietor); cf. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 
671 (1896) (holding that a void judgment brought against a sole proprietorship does not 
violate its proprietor’s double jeopardy rights). 
 43 See, e.g., Lee v. Xerox Corp., 387 S.E.2d 653, 653–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding venue 
improper in county where realty company was located because its proprietor resided in a 
different county); Dowis v. Watson, 289 S.E.2d 558, 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (“The county 
of residence of a sole proprietorship is the county of residence of its proprietor.”). 
 44 CLARK, supra note 17, at 19–20 (“Legal personality effects a clear saving of transaction 
costs, and the cumulative effect of these mundane savings is very great.”). 
 45 See id. (citing as an example “the ability of a corporation to own real estate in its own 
name”). 
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One way to view mechanical efficiency is not by consolidation of 
the number of actors but by the reduced cost of transactions.  For ex-
ample, it is likely that the solitary alter ego view restricts a sole pro-
prietor’s ability to obtain credit in the business’s name.  An illustra-
tion of the negative effect of this view is when a creditor who relies 
solely on a business’s reported credit history successfully brings suit 
against the sole proprietor individually for an unpaid business obliga-
tion,46 “[b]ecause a sole proprietorship has no legal identity apart 
from its owner.”47  Such an approach may limit a sole proprietor’s 
ability to effectuate credit in both her personal name and in the 
business’s name, reducing the amount of total credit available and 
eliminating the opportunity for the business to develop its own cred-
itworthiness. 
Another major advantage of legal entity status is “to minimize dis-
ruption and to preserve the going concern value of business ven-
tures.”48  Another downside of the solitary alter ego view of sole pro-
prietorships is that the death of the owner results in the complete 
dissolution of the business, disallowing a smooth continuation of the 
business.49  “Insurance policies can protect a sole proprietor to some 
degree, but liabilities in excess of insurance proceeds may be satisfied 
from the sole proprietor’s own assets.”50  Should a sole proprietor 
seek discharge from business obligations, the proprietor must declare 
personal bankruptcy.51  Alternatively, if the sole proprietor files a per-
sonal bankruptcy petition, her individual assets and liabilities and her 
business’s assets and liabilities will be adversely affected.52 
Under the solitary alter ego view, if the sole proprietorship has 
been legally wronged, it is the proprietor and not the business who is 
the appropriate plaintiff; if the business does wrong, the proprietor 
and not the business is the proper defendant.53  However, 
 
 46 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 43. 
 47 Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 50 P.3d 431, 432, 435 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (“At 
common law, sole proprietorships are not ‘legal entities.’  Neither are partner-
ships. . . . Rather, sole proprietorships and partnerships are deemed to be merely the al-
ter egos of the proprietor or the partners (as individuals).” (quoting State v. ABC Towing, 
954 P.2d 575, 577–78 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998))). 
 48 CLARK, supra note 17, at 20. 
 49 See 1 ALBERTY, supra note 38, § 3:13 (discussing succession plans for sole proprietorships 
to avoid dissolution in the event of the proprietor’s death); HARRY J. HAYNSWORTH, 
SELECTING THE FORM OF A SMALL BUSINESS ENTITY 3 (1985) (“Legally a sole proprietor-
ship ceases to exist at the proprietor’s death.”). 
 50 9 MERTENS THE LAW OF FED INCOME TAX § 35A:05 (Supp. 2005). 
 51 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 43. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 44–45. 
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“[p]rocedural statutes or rules of court may set forth the appropriate 
manner to name a [sole] proprietorship and its owner as a defen-
dant.”54  Accordingly, “in litigation involving a [sole] proprietorship it 
is customary in many jurisdictions to use the dba (doing business as) 
designation when bringing suit on a business obligation.”55 
In summary, under the solitary alter ego view of sole proprietor-
ship, a sole proprietor is legally disadvantaged in that, without further 
action, she is unable to own property in her business’s name, obtain 
credit in her business’s name, sue or be sued in her business’s name, 
avoid personal liability for her business’s contract and tort liability, 
and segregate the business’s tax liability from her own personal tax 
liability.56  Hence, the solitary alter ego view increases mechanical in-
efficiency, adds transaction costs, reduces savings, and maximizes dis-
ruption, thereby seriously restricting the ability of a sole proprietor to 
compete with an owner who is using other legal business forms. 
C.  The Law Also Fails to Distinguish Sole Proprietorship Law from Other 
Common Law Principles 
Currently, sole proprietorship law is intertwined with agency law,57 
perhaps in recognition of the important role that agency law plays in 
the operation of sole proprietorships (although no more than in the 
operation of other types of business enterprises).  “Under common 
law rules, a ‘sole proprietorship is created by the mutual assent of 
proprietor and agent,’ under which agency law imposes on the agent 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty with no corresponding duty on the proprie-
tor.”58  When receiving scholarly treatment, sole proprietorship law is 
usually relegated to an introduction to agency law, as if they are one 
and the same.59 
 
 54 Id. at 45. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See generally RIEVA LESONSKY, START YOUR OWN BUSINESS:  THE ONLY START-UP BOOK 
YOU’LL EVER NEED (2d ed. 2001); MICHAEL SPADACCINI, ULTIMATE BOOK ON FORMING 
CORPORATIONS, LLC’S, SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS, AND PARTNERSHIPS (2004). 
 57 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing sole proprietorships under the rubric of 
agency law). 
 58 Crusto, supra note 5, at 395 (quoting Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Cor-
poration Contract:  A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 227 (1992)). 
 59 See, e.g., RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that “[a]lthough agency law applies 
to all forms of business, it is frequently invoked when dealing with the most basic (and 
most common) form—the sole proprietorship”); RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10 (“The rela-
tionships between the owner and the other inputs in a sole proprietorship are not cov-
ered in a separate business association statute . . . . [T]he most important body of case law 
that applies to this type of firm [is] the common law of agency . . . .”); SELIGMAN, supra 
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Sole proprietorship law is often seen as indistinguishable from 
and governed by common law default rules.60  For example, sole pro-
prietors are subject to general rules of tort liability.61  “Under the 
common law, a person has three sources of liability:  direct, vicarious, 
and liability resulting from a sole proprietorship’s fiduciary duties.”62  
Therefore, as long as the voluntary act has some causal link with the 
harm caused to the victim, the intent or negligence of the sole pro-
prietor is irrelevant.63 
While common rules and principles of tort, contract, and agency 
law apply to all business entities, this does not negate the need to 
identify and codify unique rules and principles that govern and regu-
late sole proprietors.64 
D.  The Current Views of a Sole Proprietorship Are Ripe for Reform 
The law’s current views of the sole proprietorship are ripe for re-
form.  As the most used and extremely valuable business form in the 
United States, often from the perspective of both the sole proprietor 
and the outside world, a sole proprietorship is treated as an entity 
separate and distinct from its owner.  As a result, a sole proprietor-
ship should be viewed as a legal entity for at least “titling” purposes, 
such as conveying business property in the business name, obtaining 
credit in the business name including establishing separate business 
creditor priorities from those of the sole proprietor’s individual 
creditors, issuing financial instruments on behalf of the business, su-
ing and being sued for business matters in the business’s name, trans-
ferring ownership of the business in the business name, and permit-
ting the business to continue beyond the death of the sole proprietor. 
 
note 2, at 27 (“The source of the most significant legal principles for the sole proprietor-
ship is the law of agency.”). 
 60 Crusto, supra note 5, at 390. 
 61 John H. Matheson, Choice of Organizational Form for the Start-Up Business, 1 MINN. J. BUS. L. 
& ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7, 8 (2002) (“The substantive law of . . . torts . . . govern[s] the sole 
proprietorship, including the personal liability of the owner for the obligations of the 
business.”). 
 62 Crusto, supra note 5, at 390. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See discussion infra Part III (making the case for a uniform sole proprietorship statute). 
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1.  The Sole Proprietorship Is the Most Used Type of Business Enterprise, 
Has Great Economic Significance, and Has Historical and 
International Significance 
Given that the sole proprietorship is the most prevalent business 
form in this country,65 sole proprietorship law is worth reviewing for 
the sake of both sole proprietors and the attorneys who represent 
them.66  As mentioned briefly in the Introduction, the sole proprie-
torship is the simplest form of business type, requiring merely con-
ducting a business owned and often operated by one person.67  A sole 
proprietorship can also result by operation of law from a defective 
solely-owned corporation, a defective solely-owned limited liability 
company, or a formerly-two-person-owned partnership where one 
partner disassociates (perhaps by death) and the surviving partner 
continues the business.68 
While sole proprietorship total revenue is dwarfed by that of cor-
porations,69 the sole proprietorship business form is used to operate 
large as well as small business enterprises.70  They are greatly used in 
the service industry, with the largest numbers and producing the 
most significant net income and are also used in agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing, and in wholesale and retail trade.71  For these reasons, it 
is essential that sole proprietorship law be further explored. 
 
 65 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 10. 
 66 See generally 1 ALBERTY, supra note 38. 
 67 See id. § 3:2 (stating that all that is necessary to create a sole proprietorship is the sole 
proprietor’s desire to enter into business); Nolo.com, Sole Proprietorship Basics, 
http://www.nolo.com/article.cfm/objectID/3FD19141-DB91-4FCA-BDB93416A4D05479
/111/182/147/ART (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (stating that the sole proprietorship is the 
simplest legal structure for those going into business on their own). 
 68 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that not all business forms result from conscious 
and rational selection by their owner and legal counsel, and that the law provides for de-
fault forms for business). 
 69 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that “the cumulative receipts of the ten largest 
corporations exceeded the gross receipts of the 15 million-odd proprietorships”); Biz 
Stats, Free Business Statistics and Financial Ratios Site Map, http://www.bizstats.com/
business.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (showing that corporations account for a large 
percentage (85%) of total business revenues in the United States in 2003); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, supra note 10 (showing that in 2004, there were over 1 million corporations with 
over $1 million in business receipts compared to only 109,000 non-farm proprietorships 
with the same amount of business receipts). 
 70 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 10, at 485 (“A sole proprietorship is an unincorpo-
rated business owned by one person and may include large enterprises with many em-
ployees and hired managers and part-time operators.”). 
 71 CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 9–10 (referencing 1980 figures from the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1986). 
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2.  “Sole Proprietorship” Is Often a Misnomer for a Larger Business 
Enterprise and Sometimes for a Large Enterprise 
Perhaps the greatest reason for treating the sole proprietorship as 
a legal entity for some purposes is because it is a larger business en-
terprise than its name suggests.  That is, when one takes an economic 
overview of the sole proprietorship, one uncovers that the sole pro-
prietorship, while legally owned by one person, is often a family-run 
business,72 employing family members as functional, partial owners.73  
The sole proprietorship’s use of family members is a profitable strat-
egy and sometimes a questionable means of avoiding tax liability.74  
Consequently, “[t]he line between employees and owners (or poten-
tial owners) of a business is sometimes not clear cut.”75  From this 
brief discussion of the sometimes familial nature of the sole proprie-
torship, one can easily see that sole proprietorships are often more 
than mere alter egos of their apparent, named owners. 
Whether or not it is a family-owned business, a sole proprietorship 
is sometimes a large economic enterprise involving many non-
relatives.76  A sole proprietor typically will not conduct the business by 
herself, but will engage various people such as salespersons, mechan-
ics, and attorneys to act on her behalf and subject to her control.77  In 
applying contract entity or agency analysis to the sole proprietor-
ship,78 one quickly discovers that the sole proprietorship represents a 
 
 72 See generally PAT B. ALCORN, SUCCESS AND SURVIVAL IN THE FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS 
(1982) (discussing the influence and participation of families in small, privately owned 
businesses); Louis B. Barnes & Simon A. Hershon, Transferring Power in the Family Business, 
HARVARD BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1976, at 105, 105–14 (describing the organization of family 
businesses and the challenges of transferring ownership from one generation to the 
next). 
 73 Bruce A. Kirchhoff & Judith J. Kirchhoff, Family Contributions to Productivity and Profitability 
in Small Businesses, 25 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 25, 26 (1987) (exploring “the effects of family 
involvement on productivity and profitability” on family businesses); see also Shanker & 
Astrachan, supra note 15, at 112–14 (discussing the role of family members in sole pro-
prietorships). 
 74 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 36–37 (reporting that a 1992 study showed that hiring 
employees creates large tax obligations for employers). 
 75 Id. at 37. 
 76 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that a sole proprietorship “may be large and 
complex, involving many people other than the owner, and can plainly be an ‘organiza-
tion’ in the nonlegal sense of the term”). 
 77 EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining further that the law of agency facilitates the sole 
proprietor’s bidding). 
 78 See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 9–12 (2003) (comparing the transactional cost theory of 
the firm as a set of transactions of cost-reducing relationships to Ronald Coase, The Nature 
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
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nexus of economic and business interests.  Through the use of out-
side agents via contracts, the sole proprietor often reduces internal 
operating overhead.79  As such, the sole proprietorship may have 
some advantages over other types of business enterprise.80 
In summary, the sole proprietorship is the most-used business 
form in the United States, makes significant contributions to the 
economy, often involves family members, and sometimes is a large 
business that employs many non-relative agents.  For these and other 
reasons, one can conclude that the law should consider a more so-
phisticated view of the sole proprietorship.  From all of the above, it is 
posited that the sole proprietorship should be viewed as the alter ego 
of its owner for some purposes and as a legal entity for titling pur-
poses. 
III.  THE SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A LEGAL ENTITY 
FOR TITLING PURPOSES 
Part III proposes that the sole proprietorship should be viewed as 
a legal entity for titling purposes and as an alter ego of its owner for 
other purposes.  It analyzes the value of legal entity status, presents 
case law examples of the sophisticated nature of and probing issues 
surrounding modern sole proprietorship law, and suggests that entity 
equality requires that the sole proprietorship be treated as a legal en-
tity for titling purposes comparable to all other business forms. 
A.  Legal Entity Status Has Great Value to Business Associations 
Legal entity status, or entity status, is one of the most significant 
and most ignored features of business life.81  As previously mentioned, 
entity status is “the creation of fictional but legally recognized entities 
or ‘persons’ that are treated as having some of the attributes of natu-
 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985))); Mi-
chael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (analyzing firm ownership struc-
ture through theories of agency, property rights, and finance). 
 79 See Poznak Law Firm Ltd., Doing Business as a Sole Proprietor, http://www.poznaklaw
.com/articles/solep.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (explaining how the operation of a 
business as a sole proprietorship can help the owner avoid double taxation of income). 
 80 See DANIEL WM. FESSLER, ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF 
PROFIT:  CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, JOINT VENTURES 
AND RELATED AGENCY CONCEPTS 4–6 (3d ed. 1991) (describing such advantages). 
 81 CLARK, supra note 17, at 15.  See generally Mark, supra note 17 (discussing the the devel-
opment of the corporation as an autonomous legal entity in the American legal system). 
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ral persons.”82  An “unincorporated entity” is defined as “an organiza-
tion or artificial legal person that either has a separate legal existence 
or has the power to acquire an estate in real property in its own 
name . . . . includ[ing] a general partnership, limited liability com-
pany, limited partnership, business trust, joint stock association and 
incorporated nonprofit association.”83 
In order to appreciate the benefits that legal entity status would 
bring to the sole proprietorship, one need only look at the value of 
entity status to other business entities.  For example, general partner-
ships have certain entity features:  the power to sue or be sued in the 
partnership name, the right to hold and convey title to property in 
the partnership name, and the ability to provide for continuation of 
the partnership by contract even when the partnership technically 
dissolves because of a change in membership.84 
Entity status results from state statutory authority as represented in 
the following examples.  First, under state incorporation statutes, a 
corporation as a separate legal entity has separate rights, powers, and 
liabilities separate from those who own or manage it.  A corporate en-
tity can own and hold title to property, and is liable for its debts.  Ad-
ditionally, the continued existence of a corporation is unaffected by 
changes in its shareholders and is liable for its debts.85  Second, com-
paratively, although both the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) and 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”) fail to expressly de-
fine the term “entity,” the UPA views a general partnership in part as 
a legal entity86 while the RUPA does so in whole.87  Third, under the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, “[a] limited liability com-
pany is a legal entity distinct from its members.”88  And fourth, under 
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partnership is de-
 
 82 CLARK, supra note 17, at 15. 
 83 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(24A) (3d. ed. Supp. 2000). 
 84 RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 2, at 6–7.  See generally Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate 
Dispute:  Conceptualism and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 397–401 
(1989) (discussing the legal-person conceptual approach and the functional approach to 
partnership relationships). 
 85 RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 2, at 7. 
 86 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (“UPA”) §§ 8(3), 9(1), 25, 40(h) (1914) (considering a partnership 
as a legal entity under these sections). 
 87 See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (“RUPA”) §§ 101(10), 201(a), 307(a) (1997).  Section 201(a) 
states:  “A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”  In addition, under § 307(a), 
"[a] partnership may sue and be sued” in its own name.  Furthermore, § 101(10) defines 
“person” as “an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, associa-
tion, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or 
any other legal or commercial entity.” 
 88 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (1996). 
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fined as “an entity, having one or more general partners and one or 
more limited partners, which is formed under this [Act] by two or 
more persons . . . .”89  Furthermore, as an entity, a limited partnership 
is distinct from its partners.90 
Legal entity status allows a business enterprise mechanical effi-
ciencies to save money, operate more effectively, and arguably be 
more profitable.  With needs similar to businesses organized under 
other legal forms, there is no good reason why sole proprietorships 
should be denied statutory benefits similar to those granted to other 
legal entities. 
B.  The Complexity of Modern Issues Facing the Sole Proprietorship Requires 
That It Be Granted Legal Entity Status in Some Circumstances 
Compared to owners of other business forms, sole proprietors 
face the same business challenges, have unique legal issues, and re-
quire distinctive applications of common law rules.  The following 
discussion shows that sole proprietorship law is distinct from general 
common law principles; and, as a result, sole proprietorship law re-
quires statutory recognition. 
1.  The Sole Proprietorship Is a Distinct Body of Law, Raising Unique 
Legal Issues, Rules, and Principles 
Like all business types, the sole proprietorship is subject to certain 
common law rules.  And, like other business types, the sole proprie-
torship possesses distinctive legal issues, rules, and principles.91  Not-
ing comparative differences with a general partnership, a limited 
partnership, and a corporation, a sole proprietorship has the follow-
ing attractions and distractions: 
 
 89 UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 102(11) (2001) (brackets in original). 
 90 Id. § 104(a). 
 91 See, e.g., CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (noting that “[a]lthough proprietorships are 
the most numerous form of business organization, there is no distinctive body of law 
about them.  One does not find any treatises or digest titles devoted to them. . . . But sole 
proprietors do have their problems, both as their duties and as to their rights”); FESSLER, 
supra note 80, at 4–6 (describing the many advantages of not incorporating); HAMILTON, 
supra note 5, at 29–41 (discussing essential terms and concepts of unincorporated busi-
nesses and closely held corporations); CHESTER A. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 2.02, 2.04 (1989) (discussing the characteristics and 
advantages of individual proprietorship and limited partnerships); Crusto, supra note 5, 
at 387–89 (providing a list of twenty-eight unique characteristics of sole proprietorships); 
cf. RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that the most important body of case law ap-
plying to sole proprietorships is the common law of agency). 
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(1) No documentation or filing essential for existence; 
(2) No initial and annual franchise or license tax; 
(3) Owners are individually liable for business debts; 
(4) Judicial proceedings are in the name of the individual owner; 
(5) Transfer of ownership requires conveyancing formalities; 
(6) Ownership and authority are terminated by the death of the 
proprietor; 
(7) Distributed profits are taxed only as income of the members; 
(8) Enterprise profits are taxed as the income of members even 
though they are undistributed; and 
(9) Enterprise losses are offset against the members’ individual 
taxable incomes.92 
Based on these features, compared to other business enterprises, 
one might conclude that the sole proprietorship is most similar to the 
general partnership, except that a general partnership is composed 
of two or more persons while a sole proprietorship is composed of 
only one person.93  As noted above, as a general partnership is both a 
legal entity separate from its partner owner and a legal aggregate of 
partners, there is no reason why a sole proprietorship could not exist 
separately from the sole proprietor.  Inquiring into the case law 
might provide some insight into the complex and distinctive nature 
of sole proprietorship law. 
The following survey is a brief, non-exhaustive study of the case 
law concerning the sole proprietorship.  The author believes that this 
survey is sufficient evidence that sole proprietorship law exists as a 
separate body of law, distinct from general common law principles 
and other business forms.  While the majority of the following cases 
follow the solitary alter ego view of sole proprietorships, the courts 
often grapple with sole proprietorships as legal entities and the deci-
sions illustrate the inequity of treating sole proprietors differently 
from owners of other business associations. 
a.  Sole Proprietorship as Alter Ego of the Sole Proprietor 
A Texas case94 illustrates that despite the truism that a sole pro-
prietorship is the alter ego of the sole proprietor, courts sometimes 
grapple with the reality that a sole proprietorship is often operated as 
a separate business enterprise under an assumed name: 
 
 92 CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 93 See id. 
 94 Holberg & Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Assurance Co., 856 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
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[A] plaintiff brought suit against Holberg & Co., a [sole] proprietorship 
owned by Robert E. Holberg, naming as the defendant only the business 
in its assumed name.  After obtaining a judgment for over $90,000, the 
plaintiff moved to add Robert E. Holberg’s name individually to the 
judgment.  The trial court did so and Robert E. Holberg appealed on the 
ground there was no evidence indicating he was personally responsible 
for the debt.  Not only did the appellate court affirm the trial court’s ac-
tion . . . , but it also sanctioned the defendant’s attorney for filing a frivo-
lous appeal taken “for delay and without sufficient cause.”95 
According to the court, the “[c]ompany was, in law and in fact, 
one and the same as Holberg, because the sole proprietorship has a 
legal existence only in the identity of Holberg.”96 
b.  Constitutional Duty to Treat Sole Proprietors and Corporate Officers 
Equally 
In assessing the application of § 17a(1)(e)97 of the Bankruptcy Act 
to sole proprietors, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right of 
sole proprietors to equal treatment with corporate officers.  In United 
States v. Sotelo, the Court held that the principal officer and majority 
shareholder of a corporation had to pay underpaid taxes after declar-
ing bankruptcy in accordance with § 17a(1)(e).98  The Court ex-
plained that the overall policy of the Bankruptcy Act of giving bank-
rupt corporations a “fresh start” does not override Congress’s specific 
intent in § 17 a(1)(e) to make liability for unpaid taxes non-
dischargeable, particularly because a contrary result “would have the 
effect of allowing a corporation and its officers to escape all liability 
for unpaid withholding taxes while leaving liable for such taxes after 
bankruptcy those individuals who do business in the sole proprietor-
 
 95 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 41 (quoting and discussing Holberg, 856 S.W.2d at 515). 
 96 Holberg, 856 S.W.2d at 518; accord Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 50 P.3d 431, 
435–36 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a sole proprietorship was essentially a trade 
name that its owner operated, and thus, the owner was personally liable for judgments 
against the trade name). 
 97 Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 2, 80 Stat. 270 (1966) (repealed, but amending 11 
U.S.C. 35 § 17(a)(1)(e)) (making nondischargeable in bankruptcy “any taxes . . . which 
the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others . . . , but has not paid over”).  This 
provision has typically been applied in conjunction with § 6672 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which provides that if “[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and 
pay over” federal taxes “willfully fails” to do so, that person shall be liable for a “penalty” 
equal to the amount of the taxes in question.  I.R.C. § 6672 (2000). 
 98 436 U.S. 268 (1978). 
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ship or partnership, rather than the corporate, form.”99  Thus, sole 
proprietors, like corporate officials, were liable for unpaid taxes un-
der the Act.100 
While the Sotelo dissent opposed holding corporate officials liable 
under § 17a(1)(e),101 the majority believed that discharging corporate 
officials from liability but still holding sole proprietors liable would 
result in a tremendous injustice to the ordinary businessman.102  The 
majority noted that in passing § 17a (1) “Congress was expressly con-
cerned about the fact that the operation of prior law was ‘unfairly 
discriminatory against . . . the unincorporated small businessman.’”103  
Indeed, “Congress recognized that a bankrupt corporation ‘dissolves 
and goes out of business,’ thereby avoiding IRS tax claims; it was 
thought inequitable that a sole proprietor or other individual would 
remain liable after bankruptcy for the same type of claims.”104  Ac-
cording to the Court, “This inequity between a corporate officer and 
[a sole proprietor], both of whom have a similar liability to the Gov-
ernment, frequently would turn on nothing more than whether the 
individual was ‘sophisticated’ enough ‘to, in effect, incorporate him-
self.’”105  Therefore, Congress’s concern about eliminating corpora-
tions’ unfair advantage over the sole proprietor played a huge part in 
the Sotelo majority’s holding.106  Sotelo shows that the Court recognizes 
the need to evaluate equality issues when applying laws to different 
business types. 
 
 99 Id. at 279–81 (citation omitted).  The Court also noted that the legislative history of 
§ 17a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act “provides . . . support for the view that respondent’s liabil-
ity should be held nondischargeable.”  Id. at 275. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 291–92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 281. 
103 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-372, at 2 (1965)). 
104 Id. (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13,817 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin), and citing 112 
CONG. REC. 13,821 (letter to Senators from Sens. Ervin and Hruska); 112 CONG. REC. 
13,822 (statement of Sen. Hruska); Letter from Edward Gudeman, Under Sec’y of Com-
merce, to Hon. James O. Eastland, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in S. 
REP. NO. 89-114, at 12 (1965); Memorandum from W. Randolph Montgomery, Chairman 
of the Nat’l Bankruptcy Conference, to Senators, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 89-114, at 16 
(1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1134, at 2 (1964); H.R. REP. NO. 86-735, at 2 (1959)). 
105 Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 281 (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13,817 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin)). 
106 See id. 
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c.  Exploring the Alter Ego Theory in the Criminal Law Context 
The criminal law generally treats a sole proprietorship and its 
owner as one.107  Yet there are exceptional instances where the crimi-
nal law has diverged from the solitary alter ego view and held a sole 
proprietor and his business to be separate entities.  The following ex-
amples are instances wherein the robbery of a sole proprietor and his 
business were counted as two separate actions of robbery.  In McKinley 
v. State,108 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s convic-
tions for two counts of armed robbery.  The defendant had taken 
money from a pharmacy’s cash register and the wallet and wristwatch 
of its sole proprietor.  The court concluded that these two takings did 
not fall within the “single larceny doctrine,” and therefore separate 
convictions were proper.109 
Similarly, in Pagan v. State,110 the Indiana Court of Appeals found 
that a sole proprietor and his business were separate entities.  The 
court considered a convicted defendant’s claim that the State failed 
to prove robbery as alleged in the charging information.  The defen-
dant robbed a video rental store by threatening the proprietor with a 
knife until she gave him money from the cash register and a money-
bag under the counter.  The video store was operated as a sole pro-
prietorship.111  The defendant was charged with robbery with a deadly 
weapon, which requires proof that the defendant “took property 
from another person, or from the presence of another person, by us-
ing or threatening the use of force or by putting any person in fear, 
while armed with a deadly weapon.”112  The written charge was not 
phrased in terms of taking property “from the presence of another 
 
107 This concept has been universally recognized in numerous jurisdictions and applied in 
distinct criminal law cases.  Several courts have held that that the sole proprietorship does 
not qualify as an “organization” under criminal statutes and, thus, is not a separate legal 
entity that may be held liable.  See, e.g., Masonoff v. State, 546 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that the existence of a separate address or telephone number for a sole 
proprietorship does not create an “organization” sufficiently separate from the proprietor 
for him to be held liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”)); State v. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a sole 
proprietorship is not an “organization” for purposes of an anti-pollution statute and thus 
cannot be held liable for the illegal discharge of pollutants by one of its employees); State 
v. Worsencroft, 653 N.E.2d 746 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a sole proprietorship 
is not an “organization” for purposes of a federal Medicaid statute and thus cannot he 
held criminally liable). 
108 400 N.E.2d 1378 (Ind. 1980). 
109 Id. at 1379. 
110 809 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
111 Id. at 919. 
112 Id. at 918 (citing IND. CODE § 35-42-5-1 (West 2009). 
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person, but from a person, namely Hardinsburg Video, owned by 
Judy McIntyre.”113  The defendant argued that the State failed to 
prove that Hardinsburg Video was a “person” that could be robbed 
because the Indiana Criminal Code did not expressly define “person” 
to include sole proprietorships.114  Relying on the McKinley decision 
and, in the alternative, the definition of a sole proprietorship, the 
court concluded that a sole proprietorship could qualify as a “person” 
under the statute and affirmed the conviction.115 
Neither McKinley nor Pagan required the recognition of any sepa-
rate legal status for a sole proprietorship.  In McKinley, the court prac-
tically viewed the robbery incident as two separate episodes.116  It 
noted that, after the defendant first stole money from the cash regis-
ter, his actions “took on a different character” when he ordered the 
store owner to turn over his wallet and wristwatch, and kicked him in 
the face.117  In upholding the two convictions, the court did not rely 
on any notion that two separate entities owned the stolen items.118  
The court expressly noted that the rule it applied did not require 
“that the business entity be a separate ‘person’ as is a corporation or 
partnership.”119  Rather, the court merely concluded that the defen-
dant’s actions had caused different types of injuries to a single indi-
vidual.120 
The Pagan court cited McKinley for the proposition that a sole 
proprietorship could be a crime victim, separate and distinct from its 
owner.121  This limited distinction, however, stems from McKinley’s 
recognition that a single business owner may suffer from a robbery in 
two different capacities.122  The Pagan court provided an alternative 
 
113 Id. at 918–19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 Id. at 919. 
115 Id. (noting that the McKinley court “was not asked to consider whether a sole proprietor-
ship fell under the legal definition of ‘person’ in the Criminal Code”). 
116 400 N.E.2d at 1379. 
117 Id. 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
120 See id. (explaining that the defendant “wronged an individual by robbing both that indi-
vidual and that individual’s business”). 
121 Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“We are satisfied, though, that a 
sole proprietorship may qualify as a ‘person’ that can be the victim of a crime.  Our su-
preme court clearly held that a sole proprietorship may be a crime victim, separate and 
distinct from the business owner, in McKinley v. State . . . .”). 
122 See id. (explaining that McKinley held that “two separate crimes were committed when the 
defendant robbed ‘both [an] individual and that individual’s business’” (quoting 
McKinley, 400 N.E.2d at 1379)). 
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rationale for its decision that relied on the universally recognized 
status of a sole proprietorship as legally indistinct from its owner.123 
d.  Alter Ego Theory Applied in Standard “Non-Owned Auto 
Exception” in Business Liability Insurance Policies 
The sole proprietorship and its proprietor are also considered 
one and indistinguishable in the context of insurance policies.124  This 
concept is illustrated in numerous cases involving the standard “non-
owned auto exception” in business liability insurance policies.  In 
Bledsoe v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,125 an Indiana federal court 
opined as to whether the exception applied to a vehicle owned by the 
sole proprietor of an insured business.  The issue was whether the 
sole proprietor’s business liability insurance policy provided insur-
ance coverage for the unsatisfied portion of the judgment owed to 
the plaintiff by the proprietor himself.126 
In Bledsoe, a sole proprietor’s son caused a car accident that in-
jured the plaintiff.127  The sole proprietorship’s insurance policy gen-
erally excluded coverage for damages arising from the use of auto-
 
123 The Pagan court stated: 
We note in the alternative that the definition of “sole proprietorship” is “[a] 
business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and oper-
ates in his or her own personal capacity.”  Under this definition, it is clear that 
stealing property from a sole proprietorship business is tantamount to stealing 
from the individual owner of the business, who necessarily owns all of the business’ 
property.  This is so even if, under McKinley, it is possible to be convicted of two 
separate counts of robbery if a defendant forcibly takes both clearly identifiable 
“business” property and “individual” property.  Here, the only property Pagan took 
was clearly identifiable with the Hardinsburg Video business.  As such, we con-
clude that although the State was only entitled to charge Pagan with one count of 
robbery, it could allege and prove the taking of property from the “person” of 
Hardinsburg Video, which property was also necessarily the property of [its pro-
prietor], a human being. 
  Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 
(7th ed. 1999)). 
124 This concept has been universally recognized in numerous jurisdictions and applied in 
distinct tort liability cases.  See, e.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. 
Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a sole proprietorship had 
no existence apart from its proprietor, and thus business liability coverage excluded an 
automobile titled to the proprietor); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Willison, 885 P.2d 342 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1994) (holding that a vehicle titled in a sole proprietorship’s name was owned by its 
proprietor, and thus did not fall within the non-owned auto exception of the proprietor’s 
insurance policy); Samples v. Ga. Mut. Ins. Co., 138 S.E.2d. 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) 
(holding that a vehicle purchased under the name of a sole proprietorship was also 
owned by the proprietor). 
125 No. 1:04 CV 1584 DFH-TAB, 2005 WL 2491577 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 7, 2005). 
126 Id. at *3. 
127 Id. at *2. 
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mobiles, including those owned by the insured, but it also contained 
a non-owned auto exception to that exclusion that referred to the 
named insured.128  Thus, the sole proprietorship’s non-owned auto 
exception provided coverage only for vehicles not owned by the 
named insured, the sole proprietorship.129  The vehicle involved in 
the accident belonged to the proprietor individually.130  As a sole pro-
prietorship is often legally indistinguishable from its proprietor, the 
vehicle was considered as one owned by the named insured, the sole 
proprietorship.131  Consequently, the business liability exclusion ap-
plied to exclude coverage for the proprietor’s claims.132  The court 
held that the insurance company owed no duty to defend or indem-
nify the sole proprietorship under the business liability policy.133  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the widely recognized 
characteristics of the sole proprietorship and treated the insured sole 
proprietorship and its proprietor, the vehicle’s owner, as legally the 
same person.134 
In Trombley v. Allstate Insurance Co.,135 a proprietor argued that his 
sole proprietorship was a distinct legal entity from himself for pur-
poses of a business coverage exception in his insurance policy.136  The 
exception precluded any insurance coverage for damages arising out 
of the use of any vehicle owned by the insured while used for business 
purposes.137  The court found that the proprietor was the same legal 
entity as his proprietorship.138  Thus, the vehicle owned by the sole 
proprietorship, which was involved in a car wreck during business 
hours, was also owed by the proprietor himself.139  The court reasoned 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at *1, *5 (suggesting that “[state] courts would not distinguish between the sole pro-
prietorship and its owner, so that a vehicle owned by the business owner would be 
deemed owned by the insured business”); see also CU Lloyd’s of Tex. v. Hatfield, 126 
S.W.3d 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (reaching the same conclusion based on similar facts). 
131 Bledsoe, 2005 WL 2491577, at *5. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  Most courts addressing this issue in reported decisions under similar sets of facts have 
reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge 
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Willison, 885 P.2d 
342 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Hall v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 711 (Neb. 2003); 
Recalde v. ITT Hartford, 492 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 1997). 
135 640 So.2d 815 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
136 Id. at 817; see also Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 902 (N.D. 1985) (reversing 
trial court’s holding that a proprietor was a seperate entity from his businesses). 
137 Trombley, 640 So.2d at 817. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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that a proprietor who enters into a contract (i.e. an insurance policy) 
under a trade name has no separate legal existence from the sole 
proprietorship in whose name that contract is made.140  In reaching 
its conclusion, the court relied on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
Article 736, which provides:  “A person who does business under a 
trade name is the proper defendant in an action to enforce an obliga-
tion created by or arising out of the doing of such business.”141 
The Trombley court stated further that Louisiana courts have con-
sistently held that a suit brought against the owner in the trade name 
used was sufficient to justify rendition of judgment against the own-
er.142  Therefore, the policy’s business coverage exception applied and 
precluded the proprietor from insurance coverage.143 
e.  Dissenting Opinion Recognizes the Inequity of Exempting Sole 
Proprietors from Statutory Immunity for Negligent Supervision 
Liability Granted to Corporations and Partnerships 
Some judges recognize the inequity of statutory provisions that 
benefit corporations and partnerships but provide the same benefits 
to sole proprietors.  For example, in Madden v. Aldrich,144 the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that a sole proprietor was not entitled to statu-
tory immunity, which extended to corporations and partnerships, 
from liability for negligent supervision of persons not in privity of 
contract with the plaintiffs, and therefore could be held liable for his 
employee’s misconduct.  But a strong dissent recognized the anomaly 
of extending limited liability to firms but not to sole proprietors for 
acts of subordinates.145  The dissent found that the disparate treat-
 
140 Id.; see also Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D. Neb. 1977) (ob-
serving that “[t]he individual who does business as a sole proprietor under one or several 
names remains one person, personally liable for all his obligations”); Nat’l Sur. Co. v. 
Okla. Presbyterian Coll. for Girls, 132 P. 652, 654 (Okla. 1913) (suggesting that doing 
business under another name does not create an entity distinct from the person operat-
ing that business); Holberg & Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Assurance Co., 856 S.W.2d 515, 516–18 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a judgment rendered against a sole proprietorship is 
binding upon the proprietor contracting under the assumed name of the proprietor-
ship). 
141 Trombley, 640 So. 2d at 817 (citing LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 736). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 817–18. 
144 58 S.W.3d 342 (Ark. 2001). 
145 Id. at 360 (Imber, J., dissenting) (citing Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 42 S.W.3d 496 
(Ark. 2001)) (noting that a literal interpretation of the applicable statute, which denies 
negligent supervision liability to partnerships and corporations yet holds sole proprietor-
ships liable for the same, leads to “absurd consequences” that are clearly contrary to legis-
lative intent). 
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ment of sole proprietorships and corporations regarding negligent 
supervision liability was extremely inequitable.146  Moreover, the dis-
sent felt that the majority’s holding would “open the floodgates to law 
suits against partners, members, and officers of legal business organi-
zations by imposing liability on them for negligent or fraudulent ac-
tions taken by even the most junior attorney in the firm where the 
plaintiffs lack contractual privity with anyone in the firm.”147 
*  *  * 
This case and the others cited illustrate that sole proprietorship 
law is not merely the same as general common law principles and re-
quires recognition as being distinct and unique.  The case law also 
shows that the solitary alter ego view is not always the only view the 
law has of sole proprietorships:  the law sometimes finds a sole pro-
prietor as being separate from its business entity.  The case law fur-
ther shows that the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts recognize 
that the law sometimes treats sole proprietors inequitably compared 
to other business owners.  Finally, the case law also shows that sole 
proprietors face sophisticated challenges that require attentive spe-
cialized legal considerations. 
C.  The Sole Proprietorship Deserves Entity Equality 
As evidenced above, the alter ego theory of sole proprietorship 
law is currently ill-equipped to meet the complex challenges of effec-
tively doing business in the modern world.  If society seeks to support 
the growth and development of small businesses, it should support a 
broader view of sole proprietorships.  This Article presents one ap-
proach to doing so, that is, by providing the sole proprietorship with 
legal entity status for titling purposes.  To do so would achieve what is 
hereinafter referred to as “entity equality,” placing sole proprietors 
on equal footing with the owners of other business enterprises, part-
ners, shareholders, and limited liability members.148  Hypothetically, 
an alternative means of achieving equity equality would be to strip le-
gal entity status from other business enterprises that enjoy its bene-
fits, including the corporation. 
 
146 Id. at 359–60. 
147 Id. at 361. 
148 See discussion of other legal enterprises’ entity status infra Part V.A. 
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Entity equality for sole proprietors would give them the benefits of 
business legal entity status, that is, the ability to own property in the 
business name, to sue and to be sued in the business name, to obtain 
credit, and perhaps to limit business liability to the business itself.  
While it is noted that a sole proprietor can currently achieve these 
desirable goals by incorporating, creating a limited liability company, 
or associating as a general partnership, these actions require addi-
tional expense that would not be necessary or appropriate if the fol-
lowing statutory changes were adopted.  Appendix A is a chart of the 
current entity features of a sole proprietorship compared to those 
proposed in this Article.  Appendix B to this Article is a proposed 
uniform sole proprietorship statute that codifies the legal entity fea-
tures of a proposed revised sole proprietorship law. 
IV.  UNCONSCIOUS AND INSTITUTIONAL CLASSISM AND THE CASE FOR 
EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THEORY TO TREAT SOLE 
PROPRIETORS FAIRLY 
This Part argues that the present state of constitutional rights the-
ory fails to redress the unconscious and institutional classism that sole 
proprietors face under the current state of the law and that constitu-
tional rights theory needs expansion to find a constitutional basis for 
treating the sole proprietorship the same as other business forms, 
that is, as a legal entity for titling purposes. 
A.  Current Constitutional Considerations Fail to Redress Entity Inequality 
A constitutional analysis of entity equality—the right of the sole 
proprietorship to be granted legal entity status—demonstrates that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution does not compel the states to grant entity status to 
the sole proprietorship.  Arguing in favor of entity equality under 
current constitutional considerations would be a difficult task. 
1.  Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution provides that “No state shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”149  The 
 
149 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 (1989) (providing details on the rationale for and of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
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Equal Protection Clause can be seen as an attempt to secure the 
promise of the United States’s professed commitment to the proposi-
tion that “all men are created equal” by empowering the judiciary to 
enforce that principle against the states.150  In the wake of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the states could not, among other things, de-
prive people of the equal protection of the laws.151  The Equal Protec-
tion Clause has been applied most significantly to protect the civil 
rights of African Americans.152 
In determining whether a law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Supreme Court has applied three levels of scrutiny.  Un-
der strict scrutiny, a law is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest.  In addition, there 
cannot be a less restrictive alternative available to achieve that com-
pelling interest.153  Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is unconstitu-
tional unless it is substantially related to an important government in-
terest.154  Finally, under rational basis, a law is constitutional so long as 
it is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.155 
2.  Equal Protection and Commercial Regulations 
Arguments for entity equality must overcome the Supreme 
Court’s deference to state regulation of economic concerns.  Regard-
ing economic concerns, the Court is very deferential to state author-
ity: 
 
DECISIONMAKING:  CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the Fourteenth 
Amendment in a historical context). 
150 See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., supra note 149. 
151 See id. (discussing the expanding application of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect 
civil rights through American history). 
152 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the State’s maintenance 
of segregated educational facilities denied African American children equal protection); 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that Texas’s state system of law schools, 
which educated blacks and whites at separate institutions, was unconstitutional); Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that the Democratic primary in Texas, in which 
voting was restricted to whites alone, was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that a state’s offering of a 
legal education to whites but not to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause); Nixon v. 
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (holding that the denial of the right to vote based on race 
was unconstitutional); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that the 
exclusion of blacks from juries was a denial of equal protection to black defendants). 
153 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9 (3d ed. 2006); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Korematsu v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943). 
154 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, § 9. 
155 Id. 
 
Jan. 2009] UNCONSCIOUS CLASSISM 247 
 
When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the 
Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative de-
terminations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations.  
Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn 
upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, 
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discrimina-
tions and require only that the classification challenged be rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.  States are accorded wide latitude in 
the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and 
rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathemati-
cal exactitude.156 
As a result, the Court has applied rational basis review to eco-
nomic issues.  The Supreme Court has articulated the governing 
standard of review as follows: 
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discre-
tion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than 
others.  The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification 
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s ob-
jective.  State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their consti-
tutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some 
inequality.  A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.157 
3.  Equal Protection and the Sole Proprietorship 
Working against entity equality is the legal perception that there 
are inherent differences between a sole proprietorship and a corpo-
ration.  The primary justification for treating the sole proprietorship 
as identical to its owner and not as a separate legal entity is that 
“[t]here are inherent differences between operating a business as a 
sole proprietorship” and operating a business as a separate legal en-
tity like a corporation.158  Where there are real differences between 
 
156 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted) 
(upholding ordinance prohibiting certain businesses from operating in the city’s French 
Quarter because it rationally furthered the city’s purpose of supporting the customs and 
preserving the appearance of the area). 
157 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (holding that classifications in laws 
restricting the sale of certain goods on Sunday did not result in a denial of equal protec-
tion). 
158 Cedar Valley FS, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., No. AA-1827, 1992 WL 510794, at 
*5 (D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1992) (holding that the decision not to exempt a corporate merger 
was not a violation of Cedar Valley’s equal protection right because the denial of exemp-
tion did not constitute an arbitrary classification). 
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classifications, there is no violation of equal protection.159  As the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals has stated: 
[There is no] merit in the remaining contention that different statu-
tory treatment of “sole proprietors or partners” on the one hand, and 
corporations and corporate officers on the other, is “class legislation” 
and a denial of “equal protection.”  Treatment of corporations as a dis-
tinct class has received widespread constitutional sanction. . . . “The 
equality guaranteed by the equal protection clause is equality under the 
same conditions, and among persons similarly situated.  The Legislature 
may make a reasonable classification of persons and businesses and other 
activities and pass special legislation applying to certain classes.  The clas-
sification must not be arbitrary, but must be based upon some difference 
in the classes having a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be ac-
complished.”160 
As of now, only heightened scrutiny would circumvent the Court’s 
deferential treatment of state economic regulatory concerns under 
rational basis review.  To employ heightened scrutiny, the Court must 
find either that the sole proprietorship constitutes a suspect classifica-
tion161 or that the differing treatment of the sole proprietorship in-
fringes upon an owner’s fundamental rights.162 
4.  The Sole Proprietorship as a Suspect Classification 
On the surface, sole proprietors are not entitled to entity equality 
as a suspect class.  Suspect classes typically have a “‘history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment’ or [have] been subjected to unique disabilities 
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their 
 
159 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (not-
ing that the Equal Protection Clause “does not demand that a statute necessarily apply 
equally to all persons or require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law 
as though they were the same” (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966))); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 
63 (2001) (stating that a statutory scheme that imposed different requirements for a 
child’s citizenship depending upon whether the child’s citizen parent was his mother or 
father was “neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective” because 
“[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological 
parenthood”). 
160 Topps & Trowsers v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 102, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (quot-
ing 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 131, at 1934–36) 
(citing CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–24;) (finding no merit in the claim that different statu-
tory treatment of sole proprietors or partners and corporations or corporate officers 
amounts to class legislation and a denial of equal protection). 
161 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding 
that mental retardation is not a suspect classification “calling for a more exacting stan-
dard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation”). 
162 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that condition-
ing the right to vote on the payment of a tax violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
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abilities.”163  An alleged disadvantaged class of individuals who choose 
to operate their businesses as sole proprietorships and not as single 
member corporations or limited liability companies is not obviously a 
“suspect” class. 
But beneath the surface, sole proprietors are often composed of 
members of suspect classes, groups who have been historically dis-
criminated against and have exhibited “obvious, immutable, or dis-
tinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”164  
Take, for example, the case of African American sole proprietors.  As 
the Supreme Court considers “African Americans” to be a suspect 
class, if they were to sue the state alleging they were discriminated 
against because they are African Americans, then the class is obvi-
ously suspect.  However, if instead they were to argue that state law 
discriminates against them purely because they are sole proprietors, 
then the class is obviously not suspect.  An argument positing that the 
state discriminates against them because they are both African 
American and sole proprietors would trigger heightened scrutiny be-
cause they are African Americans. 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,165 the Court established 
criteria for determining suspect classifications while grappling with 
the question of whether mental retardation should be a suspect class, 
after a group home for the mentally retarded was denied a special 
permit in Texas.166  The Court considered four factors before con-
cluding that the mentally retarded were not a suspect class:  
(1) whether there is a history of “continuing antipathy and prejudice” 
against the group; (2) whether the group is “politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of lawmak-
ers”; (3) whether the group is defined by an “immutable” characteris-
tic; and (4) whether that characteristic is one that is generally irrele-
vant.167 
Despite a finding that mental retardation satisfied the first and 
third factors, the Cleburne Court denied suspect classification.168  This 
 
163 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)) (holding that an age classification 
in a statute requiring police officers to retire at age fifty was rationally related to the 
state’s interest of ensuring its officers’ physical preparedness). 
164 In re Watson, 332 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 
635, 638 (1986)) (noting that individuals who choose to operate their businesses as sole 
proprietorships have not been historically discriminated against). 
165 473 U.S. 432. 
166 See id. at 442–46. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 446–47. 
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analysis suggests that each factor must be fulfilled to warrant height-
ened scrutiny, which is more probing than rational basis review. 
Relative to business forms, the Supreme Court has held that cor-
porations are persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.169  States have promulgated laws that define the various as-
pects of corporations and that give corporations their distinct identity 
as a unique juridical entity.  Accordingly, because the Equal Protec-
tion Clause provides that no state can deny any person within its ju-
risdiction equal protection of the laws, it follows that the sole proprie-
torship and/or the sole proprietor should also be afforded the same 
treatment, that is, equal protection. As a result, states should enact 
laws defining the various aspects of the sole proprietorship as a dis-
tinct, unique juridical entity. 
5.  Equal Protection Challenges to Facially Neutral State Statutes 
If a suspect class of sole proprietors were to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a state statute that discriminated between the sole pro-
prietorship, the partnership, and the corporation, they would face 
additional challenges to trigger heightened scrutiny.  Presumably, the 
state statute would be facially neutral, meaning the statutory language 
has no express mention of the suspect class.  As such, to succeed, the 
claim should allege that the facially neutral law has a disparate impact 
among members of the suspect class and that discrimination against 
this class was the intent and purpose of the state act.170 
Not all regulations are equal.  A legislature can present legitimate 
reasons for legislative acts that may disadvantage street vendors over 
store front merchants or for why the length of a cargo train should be 
less than twenty-four cars.  But a legislature’s arbitrary denial by de-
fault of entity status to sole proprietorships indiscriminate of industry 
can hardly be said to have a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest.  In addition, another argument in favor of entity equality is 
that the legislative failure to grant the sole proprietorship entity 
status disadvantages small businesses, especially those composed of 
underserved, suspect class communities far more frequently, and may 
 
169 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (declaring that there was no 
need to hear argument on whether the Equal Protection Clause protected corporations, 
because “[w]e are all of opinion that it does”). 
170 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (upholding a police department’s use 
of a written personnel test even though it had a disproportionate impact on black appli-
cants because such impact alone could not infer a discriminatory intent on the part of the 
state). 
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rise to support an argument for disparate impact, although it may be 
difficult to prove discriminatory intent. 
6.  Entity Status as a Fundamental Right 
Perhaps sole proprietors can successfully argue that entity status is 
a fundamental constitutional right as a denegation of the owner’s 
right to the pursuit of happiness.  A fundamental right, as defined by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, is “akin to free speech or marriage or to 
those other rights . . . that the Court has come to regard as funda-
mental and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest before they may be significantly regulated.”171  
While it is difficult to imagine how entity status might rise to a fun-
damental right, as the following analysis demonstrates, failing to pro-
vide the sole proprietorship entity status by default and under opera-
tion of the rules and principles of the common law is inherently 
unfair and discriminatory in comparison to the law’s treatment of 
other one-person entities, namely, the one-person corporation and 
the one-person limited liability company.  Granting the sole proprie-
torship entity status ensures equal treatment with the one-person cor-
poration and the one-person limited liability company.  This is be-
cause the threats to the sole proprietorship are virtually identical to 
those facing entity businesses like the corporation.  Treating business 
types differently is inherently unfair, raising fundamental rights to 
the pursuit of happiness and equal protection issues. 
An additional constitutionally-based argument in favor of granting 
the sole proprietorship entity status might be made under the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause.  If it could be established that the lack of 
“entity protection” for sole proprietors unduly burdens interstate 
commerce, then differing treatment of different types of businesses 
would be unconstitutional. 
For the above reasons, an equal protection claim on behalf of sole 
proprietors would likely fail current judicial scrutiny. 
7.  Final Word on Current Constitutional Considerations 
While courts are generally deferential to economic regulations 
under rational basis review, state laws motivated by irrational beliefs, 
antiquated values, or stereotypic notions of class attributes may still 
 
171 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973), cited in In re Watson, 332 B.R. 740, 746 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005). 
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be suspect under rational basis review.  The lynchpin of the argument 
favoring entity equality is that the current state of the law reflects an-
tiquated notions of the sole proprietorship.  Nowadays, the sole pro-
prietorship and indeed all one-person businesses are more sophisti-
cated than ever before.  Evidence of this fact is the proliferation of 
one-person corporations and one-person limited liability companies, 
and the law’s universal acceptance of their existence as legal entities. 
V.  PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR ENTITY EQUALITY 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
does not compel the states to grant entity status to sole proprietor-
ships for titling purposes, public policy provides convincing argu-
ments why the states should choose to do so.  One argument is that 
the law has provided many public policy reasons for treating other 
business enterprises as a legal entity and that many of these apply to 
the sole proprietorship.  For example, and by way of comparison, § 4 
of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act gives an 
unincorporated nonprofit association the power to acquire an estate 
in real property, and thus an unincorporated or nonprofit association 
organized in a state that has adopted that act will be an unincorpo-
rated “legal entity.”172  The following argues on behalf of states’ adop-
tion of the entity theory of sole proprietorship for titling purposes. 
A.  All Other Business Enterprises Are Granted Legal Entity Status for Titling 
Purposes 
1.  The Corporation as a Legal Entity 
Early in the development of corporate law, a corporation was con-
sidered an artificial person or legal entity.173  “[A] corporation may 
also be viewed as a fund of property, a band of investors, a crew of 
workers, or merely as an entry in official records.”174  This relatively 
 
172 UNIF. NONPROFIT UNINCORPORATED ASSOC. ACT § 4 (1996). 
173 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 186–87.  By 1765, it was understood that a corporation has the 
power to “sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate 
name, and do all other acts as natural persons may.”  Id. at 186 (quoting WILLIAM 
BLACKTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *475).  To be sure, “Chief Justice Marshall, paraphrased 
Blackstone in a famous comment in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, [17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
250, 304 (1819)], when he defined a corporation as an ‘artificial being, invisible, intangi-
ble, and existing only in contemplation of law.’”  Id. at 187 (footnote omitted). 
174 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 192 (citing A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 416 
(1976)). 
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mundane legal characteristic, the doctrinal fiction of an artificial en-
tity, is extraordinarily important in many ways.175 
A reflection on the implications of corporation law suggests that 
entity status provides a benefit to businesses and their owners.176  In 
fact, entity status provides many benefits to a corporation, its officers, 
and its owners.  For example, entity status allows a corporation to 
“vastly reduce[] the costs of contracting for credit.”177  A corporation 
can use its separate assets “to enter into contracts, such as bank 
loans.”178  Entity status also allows a corporation to have an indefinite 
“life,” and supports tradable shares, centralized management, and 
limited liability.179 
2.  The General Partnership as a Legal Entity 
Similar to the corporation, the general partnership enjoys the 
benefits of entity status.  The general partnership has been treated as 
a legal entity for many purposes, but it was not always thought to be 
so.180  The historical development of the general partnership from a 
legal aggregate to a legal entity is instructive relative to the develop-
mental needs of the sole proprietorship. 
Historically, the common law treated general partnerships as an 
aggregation of individuals.181  In drafting the UPA in 1914, the 
NCCUSL did not totally reject the common law view of partnerships, 
often treating them as legal entities separate from their owners for 
most purposes and as legal aggregates of their owners for other pur-
poses.182  Yet, the UPA adopted the view that a general partnership 
should be legally recognized as a legal entity in several circumstances. 
 
175 See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 78, at 83–84. 
176 See id. at 83 (providing some of the practical advantages of a corporation’s entity status).  
See generally CLARK, supra note 17, at 17–19 (describing the entity status of a corporation); 
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 62–63 (same). 
177 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 78, at 83 (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000)). 
178 Id.; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 177, at 401–02 n.22 (discussing the cost-
effective strategy of participating by subincorporation). 
179 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 78, at 83–84. 
180 See CLARK, supra note 17, at 15–16 n.39 (discussing partnership treatment prior to 1907); 
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 62–63 (discussing early case law on partnerships). 
181 See CLARK, supra note 17, at 15–16 n.39. 
182 Id.; see,e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15 (1914) (stating that partners are jointly and severally 
liable for the debts of a partnership); Id. § 29 (stating that a partnership lacks continuity 
of existence); cf. I.R.C. § 701 (2000) (stating that individual partners are liable for the in-
come tax of a partnership “in their separate or individual capacities”). 
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Today, there are many circumstances under which a general part-
nership is clearly a legal entity.  For example, a partnership may ac-
quire title to real estate in the partnership name which, if so ac-
quired, can be convened only in the partnership name.183  In 
addition, each partner is an agent of the partnership.184  Any partner 
may also convey title to real property that is in the partnership name, 
but the partnership may not recover such property unless the partner 
binds the partnership.185  Additionally, a partnership’s assets, liabili-
ties, and business transactions are treated as those of the business 
unit and are considered distinct from the partners’ individual assets, 
liabilities, and non-partnership business transactions.186  In marshal-
ing assets, the partnership’s assets and liabilities are considered sepa-
rate and distinct from those of the respective individual partners, and 
partnership creditors have a prior right to partnership assets, while 
individual partners’ creditors have a prior right, respectively, to the 
separate assets of their individual debtors.187  And there are other 
provisions in the UPA that recognize the existence of a partnership as 
a separate legal entity.188 
 
183 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 8(3) (1914) (“Any estate in real property may be acquired in the part-
nership name.  Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.”). 
184 Id. § 9(1) (“Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, 
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any in-
strument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of 
which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no 
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom 
he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.”). 
185 Id. § 10(1) (“Where title to real property is in the partnership name, any partner may 
convey title to such property by a conveyance executed in the partnership name; but the 
partnership may recover such property unless the partner’s act binds the partnership un-
der the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 9, or unless such property has been con-
veyed by the grantee or a person claiming through such grantee to a holder for value 
without knowledge that the partner, in making the conveyance, has exceeded his author-
ity.”). 
186 See id. § 25(1) (“A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property 
holding as a tenant in partnership.”); id. § 25(2)(b) (“A partner’s right in specific part-
nership property is not assignable except in connection with the assignment of the rights 
of all the partners in the same property.”); id. § 25(2)(c) (“A partner’s right in specific 
partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against 
the partnership.  When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt the part-
ners, or any of them, or the representative of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right 
under the homestead or exemption laws.”). 
187 REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 40(h) (“When partnership property and the individual properties 
of the partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership creditors 
shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on individual property, 
saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as heretofore.”). 
188 See, e.g., id. § 11 (stating that a partnership is bound by an admission or representation 
made by a partner); id. § 12 (stating that a partnership is charged with knowledge of or 
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In 1994, the NCCUSL cemented the general partnership’s entity 
status in RUPA, which states that a partnership is “an entity distinct 
from its partners.”189  In addition to RUPA, other statutes treat a gen-
eral partnership as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its indi-
vidual owners.  For example, in certain state and federal courts, a 
partnership may sue and be sued in the partnership’s name.190  In ad-
dition, the Uniform Commercial Code191 and the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act192 both define a partnership as a person.  The State of Louisiana, 
following its civil law tradition, regards a partnership as a full legal 
entity.193  Therefore, a general partnership is sometimes a legal entity 
and sometimes a legal aggregate.194  By comparison to a general part-
nership, although quite different in many ways, a limited partnership 
is similarly a legal entity.195 
3.  The Limited Liability Company as Legal Entity 
Another business form, the limited liability company (“LLC”), is 
by statutory definition a legal entity.196  Like a corporation and a part-
nership, an LLC is a legal entity, separate from its owners or mem-
bers.197  Despite getting off to a slow start, in 1996, as a result of the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issuing final regulations simplifying 
 
notice to a partner of any matter concerning the partnership); id. § 13 (stating that a 
partnership is bound by any wrongful act or omission of a partner); id. § 14 (stating that a 
partnership is bound to make good the loss on account of a breach of partnership trust 
by a partner); id. § 19 (stating that partners must have access to partnership books, which 
are required to be kept at the partnership’s principal place of business); id. § 26 (stating 
that a partner’s interest in a partnership is his share of the partnership’s profits). 
189 REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 201(a) (1994) (amended 1997). 
190 See, e.g., Connecticut Licensing Info Center, Glossary of Business Structures, http://www.
ct-clic.com/Content/Glossary_of_ Business_Terms.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (indi-
cating that Connecticut is an example of a state that permits such action). 
191 U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (2005). 
192 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2000). 
193 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2806–43 (2005) (enumerating provisions that govern general 
partnerships in the state). 
194 See supra notes 182–93 and accompanying text. 
195 See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 104 (2001) (“A limited partnership is a legal entity distinct 
from its partners.”). 
196 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (1996) (“A limited liability company is a legal entity dis-
tinct from its members.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(b) (2005) (“A limited liability 
company formed under this chapter shall be a separate legal entity . . . .”).  See generally 2 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES § 19:8 (Supp. 2008) (discussing circumstances where a single-member LLC 
has an impact). 
197 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 126 (comparing LLCs to corporations and general part-
nerships). 
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tax laws, allowing taxpayers to treat unincorporated business organi-
zations on an elective “check the box” basis, LLCs achieved their 
greatest popularity.198  In addition to providing flexible tax treatment, 
LLC law was revolutionary as it was the first to grant an unincorpo-
rated entity statutory limited liability. 
As seen with corporations, partnerships, and LLCs, entity status 
has its advantages.  Clearly, sole proprietorship law begs for greater 
development and modernization along the lines of other business 
forms. 
B.  Entity Equality Demands That the Sole Proprietorship Be Granted Entity 
Status 
In addition to fair treatment as a legal entity, sole proprietorship 
law’s proposed entity status would reflect its functional separateness 
from its owner, financially, psychologically, and sociologically.199  For 
example, sole proprietorships often adopt a fictitious business name, 
must comply with general business and licensing requirements, and 
often establish a separate tax identification number.  A review of 
these aspects of the sole proprietorship shows its separation from its 
owner. 
1.  Operating Under an Assumed Name 
One example of how the sole proprietorship functions separately 
from its owner is the adoption of a trade, assumed, or fictitious 
name.200  So that the public is not deceived, state laws require that an 
assumed or fictitious name be filed in the appropriate public record; 
some prescribe criminal penalties for using an unregistered fictitious 
name.201  There are few legal restrictions on the use of specific words 
 
198 See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,585 (Dec. 18, 
1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602). 
199 EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 1. 
200 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 41 (discussing examples of the use of assumed names by 
proprietorships); Gordon E. McClintock, Fictitious Business Name Legislation—Modernizing 
California’s Pioneer Statute, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1349, 1349 (1968) (noting that “[t]he com-
mon law permitted a sole proprietor or partnership to adopt and use an assumed busi-
ness or trade name in transacting business”); cf. Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, Recommenda-
tion and Study Relating to Fictitious Business Names, 9 REPS., RECOMMENDATIONS, & STUDS. 
601, 608 (1969) (concluding that while California should keep its fictitious name statute, 
many revisions are recommended). 
201 See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS 
LAW 50 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that sole proprietorships require “no government filing ex-
cept a fictitious-business-name statement, which discloses the name under which the 
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in trade names; in most states, for example, terms such as “corpora-
tion,” “incorporated,” or “Inc.” may not be used because they falsely 
imply that the business is incorporated.202 
2.  The Sole Proprietorship Must Comply with Business Permitting, 
Licensing, and Operating Requirements 
The second area of analysis regarding how the sole proprietorship 
functions in conjunction with its owner is its compliance with busi-
ness permitting, licensing, and operating requirements.203  Since the 
sole proprietorship is essentially a private business enterprise, it is re-
quired to obtain a business license and to collect sales taxes where 
appropriate.204  Like every other business type, the sole proprietorship 
must comply with all general licensing and operating statutes.  For 
example, “[a] proprietorship that conducts a pharmacy or a gun 
shop must comply with the various legal requirements applicable to 
such businesses.”205  “If the proprietorship is engaged in a profes-
sional practice such as law, medicine, dentistry, or accounting, both 
the proprietor and each person having responsibility for providing 
professional services must be licensed.”206  Unlike a corporation, a 
“[sole] proprietorship may open a new office or facility in another 
state, without obtaining permission or qualifying to transact busi-
ness . . . [but a] corporation . . . may be required to obtain permis-
sion to transact business in the second state.”207  Opening an office in 
another state may subject the proprietor to suits in that state, may re-
quire the proprietor to file an assumed name certificate in the new 
state, and may hold the proprietor liable for state income taxes in the 
 
business will be conducted and the owner’s name and address”); CONARD ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 17. 
202 See CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 17.  See generally Checklist:  Starting a Sole Proprietor-
ship, http://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-structures/sole-proprietorship/sole-pro
prietorship-checklist.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (demonstrating how unrestrictive 
the name-choosing process is in general). 
203 See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE ch. 12 (3d ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/family_legal_guide/chapter_12.pdf 
(discussing various issues related to small businesses using a user-friendly question-and-
answer format); STATE OF IND., BUSINESS OWNER’S GUIDE TO STATE GOVERNMENT (2008), 
available at http://www.in.gov/core/files/Businesss_Owners_Guide608.pdf (providing an 
overview under Indiana law). 
204 See BUSINESS OWNER’S GUIDE, supra note 203, at 3, 5, 7. 
205 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45. 
206 Id. 
207 Id.; see also Sole Proprietor Magazine, What is Sole Proprietorship?, http://www.solepro
prietormagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=231 (noting that 
“[y]our sole proprietorship exists as soon as you start doing business”). 
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new state.208  In these ways, the sole proprietorship faces the same or 
similar licensing isses as do other business types. 
3.  Taxation of the Sole Proprietorship:  Individual or Business? 
The third instance of how the sole proprietorship functions sepa-
rate from its owner is its use of a separate tax identification number, 
as well as business tax strategies not available to individual tax filers.  
The sole proprietorship, not unlike other types of businesses, is per-
mitted to apply for and receive a tax identification number different 
from that of its owner’s social security number, such as a separate tax 
or employee identification number (“TIN” or “EIN”).209 
The manner of reporting the income and expenses of a proprietorship is 
interesting because it reflects a pragmatic compromise between the legal 
view that a proprietorship is not a separate entity from its owner and the 
economic view that that the proprietorship’s financial affairs should not 
be intermixed with the proprietor’s personal affairs.210 
In addition to often using a separate tax identification number, the 
sole proprietorship often uses business tax strategies.  While the sole 
proprietorship is not a separate taxable entity211 and is required to file 
the long-form 1040, personal tax return,212 the Internal Revenue 
Code also requires a separate tax form, Schedule C, to be prepared to 
record the gain or loss from each business owned by the taxpayer.213  
The business income or loss is reported on the proprietor’s personal 
income tax return, the form 1040, while a considerably simpler form, 
the Schedule C-EZ is available for the very smallest business that has 
no employees and less than $25,000 in gross receipts.214  “[T]he In-
ternal Revenue Code requires the entrepreneur to file quarterly dec-
larations of estimated tax, and to make the payment of estimated tax 
each quarter reflected on that declaration.215 
 
208 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45. 
209 Id. at 48; see also I.R.S. Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number (OMB 
No. 1545-0003) (2007).  See generally I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, PUBLICATION 
334 (2007), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p334.pdf (last visited Sep. 4, 2006) (pro-
viding general information about federal tax laws applicable to small business owners). 
210 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 47. 
211 See Sole Proprietorship Magazine, supra note 207. 
212 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 47. 
213 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 201, at 50. 
214 See HENRY B.R. BEALE, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., HOME-BASED BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION (2004), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs235tot.pdf. 
215 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 47.  See generally Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959) 
(assessing additional tax for the failure to file a declaration of estimated income tax with-
out reasonable cause). 
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Therefore, for the various ways in which a sole proprietor operates 
her business separate from her personal life, fundamental and dis-
tributive justice as well as socioeconomic theory demand that the pa-
rameters of constitutional theory be expanded to remedy the law’s 
failure to treat the sole proprietorship as a legal entity for titling pur-
poses. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ENTITY STATUS PROVISIONS OF THE 
USPA 
Part VI presents the opposition to treating the sole proprietorship 
as a legal entity.  What follows is a discussion of three arguments 
against the entity status provisions of the Uniform Sole Proprietor-
ship Act (“USPA”) and a response to each.  While the first one di-
rectly challenges entity status for the sole proprietorship, the other 
two challenge corollary features that may follow entity status, specifi-
cally, limited liability and perpetual existence.  In the end, none of 
these arguments outweighs the benefits of entity equality for sole 
proprietors. 
A.  The USPA Is Flawed Because One Person Cannot Legally Clone Herself 
into Another Legal Entity 
One argument against the USPA is that it contradicts a common 
viewpoint that the sole proprietorship automatically fails to qualify as 
a separate entity because it is owned by one person.216  This solitary 
alter ego view of the sole proprietorship is discussed earlier in this Ar-
ticle.217  On the surface, it seems logical that the law should not allow 
a person to legally clone herself into another, separate legal entity.  
But, in point of fact, the law currently allows legal cloning through 
the use of other legal business entities, other than the sole proprie-
torship.  That is, one person can legally create and own a one-person 
corporation; and, in many if not all jurisdictions, a one-person lim-
ited liability company or several such one-person entities. 
 
216 See GREGORY & HURST, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 2, at 833 
(“Strictly speaking, the sole proprietorship is not a business organization since, by defini-
tion, it has only one owner and indeed the owner and the business entity are one and the 
same.”); HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 2, at 251 (“For legal purposes, a proprietorship 
is not a separate entity.”); Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 50 P.3d 431, 432 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding a sole proprietor personally liable for the debts of his proprietor-
ship because “a sole proprietorship has no legal identity apart from its owner”). 
217 See supra Part II.A. 
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The laws of the one-person corporation and of the one-person 
limited liability company refute the argument that the sole proprie-
torship cannot be an entity because it is owned by one person.  But 
from a current constitutional perspective, as the sole proprietorship 
is distinctly different from the corporation and the LLC, it is not enti-
tled to equal protection treatment, as was fully explored earlier in this 
Article.218 
The following discussion of the sole proprietorship assumes that it 
must be owned by one individual, living person.  There is no statutory 
test or legal requirement that a sole proprietorship must be owned by 
a living person. As a result, as a corporation has been deemed to be a 
legal person, it is legally possible for a corporation to own a sole pro-
prietorship.  Also, as the UPA considers a partnership a legal entity 
for several purposes, it would appear that a general partnership could 
own a sole proprietorship.  And, arguably, there could be a one-
person limited liability partnership.219  This discussion of the varying 
potentional owners of a sole proprietorship shows that legal analysis 
of sole proprietorship law is never as simple as it first appears. 
1.  The One-Person Corporation or an Incorporated Proprietorship 
Historically, the corporation was not designed as an alternative to 
the sole proprietorship.220  But over the years, state statutes have pro-
vided for and courts have sanctioned corporations owned by a single 
shareholder, the “incorporated proprietorship” or “one-person cor-
poration.”221  Today, all states allow for the creation of an incorpo-
 
218 See supra Part IV. 
219 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 176. 
220 See generally WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1 (2005) (discussing the development and history of the corpo-
ration). 
221 COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, at 24 (citing Leventhal v. Atl. Fin. Corp., 55 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 
1944); Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 144 N.E. 519 (N.Y. 1924)); see, e.g., Factors & Traders’ Ins. 
Co. v. New Harbor Prot. Co., 37 La. Ann. 233 (1885) (holding that a corporation was not 
a “person” within the Louisiana statute authorizing the formation of a corporation by any 
number of “persons” not less than six); Keller v. Haas, 12 So.2d 238 (La. 1943) (holding 
that an individual shareholder could not use a corporation to shield himself from per-
sonal liability); L.L. Ridgeway Co. v. Marks, 146 So.2d 61, 63 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (holding 
that even if the shares of a corporation pass into the hands of one person, the theory of 
the corporate entity and limited liability is preserved); Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166 So. 636, 
638 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (holding also that a shareholder cannot use a corporation as a 
shiled against personal liability).  For general discussions of the one-person corporation, 
see ROBERT A. ESPERTI & RENNO L. PETERSON, INCORPORATING YOUR TALENTS:  A GUIDE 
TO THE ONE-PERSON CORPORATION OR HOW TO LEAD A SHELTERED LIFE 5–6 (1984); 
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 213–18; Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man 
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rated proprietorship wherein one person owns all the shares of the 
corporation and operates the business with total autonomy.222  The 
incorporated proprietorship’s assets are legally owned by the corpo-
ration; the shares have value only to the extent the corporation’s 
business and assets have value; shares are not the same as the corpo-
rate assets.223  But a sole entrepreneur may be best advised to incorpo-
rate her enterprise and elect “S-corporation” tax treatment to avoid 
potentially costly reclassification as a corporation and double taxa-
tion.224 
2.  The One-Person Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) 
Similar to the one-person corporation, in virtually every state to-
day, one person may form a limited liability company.225  Generally, 
LLCs have seven chief legal characteristics.226  A one-person LLC may 
be member-managed or manager-managed.227  In a member-managed 
LLC, each member has the right to participate in management deci-
sion-making and to sign contracts on behalf of the LLC, whereas in a 
 
Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473 (1953); Warner 
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual:  A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373 
(1938); R. Barry McComic, Theory of the Corporate Entity and the One-Man Corporation in Lou-
isiana, 38 TUL. L. REV. 738 (1964); Mario Rotondi, Limited Liability of the Individual Trader:  
One-Man Company or Commercial Foundation?, 48 TUL. L. REV. 989 (1974). 
222 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 214 & n.62 (noting that some states require that there be 
more than one director and more than one officer); id. at 252 (describing some of the 
modifications of the standard corporate form for closely held corporations, such as a re-
ducing the size of the board of directors and allowing one person to perform all corpo-
rate functions).  See generally Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 336–39 (describing various statu-
tory strategies to address the unique problems of closely held corporations). 
223 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 214–15. 
224 See id. at 143. 
225 See Findlaw, Limited Liability Company FAQ—Small Business, http://smallbusiness.find
law.com/business-structures/llc/llc-faq.html (“You can form an LLC in any state with just 
one owner.”); see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(A)(10) (2005) (defining the limited 
liability company as “an entity that is an unincorporated association having one or more 
members that is organized and existing under this Chapter”).  See generally HAMILTON, su-
pra note 5, at 143 (noting that several states specifically authorize the creation of a one-
person LLC). 
226 John M. Cunningham, What Are the Main Legal Characteristics of LLCs?  How Do the Charac-
teristics of LLCs Compare with Those of Non-LLC Entities? (2005), http://www.llcformations
.com/3.1%20LLC%20legal%20characteristics%20-%204-14-04.htm.  These characteristics 
include:  (1) entity status; (2) a one-member minimum; (3) contractual freedom and en-
forceability; (4) statutory informality; (5) statutory liability shielding; (6) statutory asset 
protection; and (7) two alternate management structures—member-management or 
manager-management.  Id. 
227 Id. 
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manager-managed LLC a select group manages the business.228  The 
LLC is an alternative for the sole proprietor seeking to shield her 
personal assets from her business liabilities without the legal com-
plexity of operating as a corporation. 
*  *  * 
Overall, critics of the entity status provisions of the USPA fail to 
account for the fact that the law currently allows one-owner entities to 
clone themselves as legal entities under both corporation law and 
limited liability company law.  Clearly, there are benefits to granting 
the sole proprietorship entity status, as reflected by benefits and effi-
ciencies that one-person corporations and one-person limited liability 
companies enjoy.  The entity status benefits of the USPA include the 
ability to take title to property, to establish credit, to enter into leases, 
and to open bank accounts, all in the name of the business entity. 
B.  The USPA Impliedly Grants Sole Proprietorships Limited Liability Along 
with Entity Status 
A second argument against the USPA is that it impliedly grants 
limited liability to the sole proprietorship, contrary to recent argu-
ments favoring the complete abolition of total limited liability.229  As 
the sole proprietor owns all the property used by the business, she is 
and should be personally responsible for all of the business’s debts.230  
The author believes that the sole proprietorship should be granted 
limited liability, in addition to titling benefits, to achieve full equality 
with other business types.  The codification of sole proprietorship 
 
228 See generally James R. Walker, Limited Liability Companies:  Structuring Members’ Economic 
Rights, 34 COLO. LAW. 73 (2005) (discussing structuring an LLC in order to maximize the 
economic rights of its members). 
229 See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 37–41 
(1999) (citing as an example, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (promoting pro-rated 
shares of corporate tort liabilities)); Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
ity Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992) (arguing that procedural ob-
stacles will make it unlikely that changes in state law will affect a corporation’s excess tort 
liability); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability:  A Capital Markets 
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992) (arguing that efforts to regulate through market ma-
nipulation will generally fail to meet desired objectives); David W. Leebron, Limited Liabil-
ity, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991) (promoting an aggregate 
approach to piercing the corporate veil). 
230 HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 39; see also BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 201, at 50 (explain-
ing that the sole proprietorship is often considered a poor business choice because the 
owner has unlimited liability, which puts all her personal assets at risk). 
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law, such as the USPA, is an essential first step toward a limited liabil-
ity sole proprietorship statute (“LLSP”).231  But granting the sole pro-
prietorship entity status for titling purposes alone does not imply or 
require granting it limited liability. 
Limited liability and entity status are not joined at the hip like 
Siamese twins.  Entity status and limited liability are not one and the 
same.  A business enterprise might have legal entity status separate 
from its owners, while the owners continue to have personal liability 
for the business’s liabilities.232  In addition, the law fails to provide the 
owners of limited liability entities an absolute shield against business 
liabilities.233  For example, courts have developed “piercing the corpo-
rate veil” law to impose personal liability on shareholders for business 
liabilities,234 with most piercing cases involving three or fewer share-
holders.235  On the other hand, sole proprietors, like the owners of 
other business forms, are responsible for their agents’ actions under 
the principles of agency law.236 
Sole proprietors may achieve some limited liability protections 
without statutory entity status.  For example, they can avoid personal 
exposure for business liabilities, such as a loan from a creditor, if the 
lender agrees to a “nonrecourse” loan.237  In addition, they may be en-
titled to some statutory protections including homestead, anti-
seizure, and prohibition against garnishment for wages.238  As previ-
ously discussed, infra Part III.B.1.e, under recent case law, a sole pro-
prietor was not entitled to statutory immunity for negligent supervi-
sion liability extended to corporations, partnerships, and persons not 
 
231 See Crusto, supra note 5, at 397–417 (providing provisions of a proposed Model LLSP 
Act). 
232 See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103–105 (1997) (describing the nature of liability for a part-
ner and a partnership in relation to a partner’s wrongful act). 
233 See Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (suggesting that the liability protection afforded to LLCs “will 
not be markedly different than the protection provided by the corporate form”). 
234 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 541–44 (“The separateness of the corporate en-
tity is normally to be respected.  However, a corporation’s veil will be pierced whenever 
corporate form is employed to evade an existing obligation, circumvent a statute, per-
petuate fraud, commit a crime, or work an injustice.”). 
235 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil:  An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036, 1036 (1991) (analyzing an empirical study of reported appellate piercing cases). 
236 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958). 
237 See RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that “[c]ourts have generally enforced 
the liability limiting provisions of nonrecourse contracts, at least where the party alleged 
to be bound knew of the limitations and consented to them”). 
238 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 42–43 & n.9 (stating that if a proprietor files for bank-
ruptcy, individual and business assets and liabilities are covered). 
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in privity of contract with the plaintiff, and therefore could be held 
liable for the employee’s misconduct.239  A strong dissent recognized 
the anomaly of extending limited liability to firms for the acts of sub-
ordinates but not to the sole proprietorship.240 
To refute the limited liability critique of the USPA, one needs 
only to analyze RUPA’s treatment of general partnerships.241  There 
the law grants a general partnership entity status while expressly 
maintaining personal joint and several liabilities to its partners.242  
Therefore, it is possible to follow the statutory lead of RUPA by pro-
viding the sole proprietorship entity status for titling purposes while 
maintaining personal, flow-though exposure for business liability.  By 
doing so, the USPA would avoid creating a whole new universe of veil-
piercing problems, but this is beyond the purview of this Article.243 
C.  The USPA Wrongly Creates Perpetual Life for Sole Proprietorships 
A third argument against the USPA is that the USPA contradicts 
the practical reality that when the sole proprietor dies (or disassoci-
ates through retirement, sale, or gift) her business often ends as well.  
This critique has some practical merit, but this is an advantage of the 
USPA, not a defect.  Promoting longevity and flexibility of transfer in 
ownership would likely be beneficial to the sole proprietor and would 
be consistent with entity equality.  The continuation of the business 
under different ownership would be very desirable in the case of a 
family-operated business or where employees may want to buy out the 
owner, such as under a profit-sharing plan.244  Therefore, in order to 
refute this argument against the USPA, one need only look to con-
 
239 Madden v. Aldrich, 58 S.W.3d 342 (Ark. 2001). 
240 Id. at 360 (Imber, J., dissenting). 
241 See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103–105 (1997). 
242 Id. 
243 See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 229, at 41–68 (describing procedures and contexts for 
piercing the corporate veil); John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing 
the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities:  An Opportunity to Codify the Test for 
Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 177 (2000) (noting that 
“[d]epriving small business owners of their limited-liability protection because of their 
indebtedness runs counter to the purpose” of the statute); Stephen B. Presser, The Boga-
lusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,” and Other Errors:  Academics, Economics, 
Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability:  Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing 
the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 420–27 (2006) (analyzing whether the use of 
“single business enterprise” is suitable in determining liability); Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the 
Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1994) (listing criteria 
courts use to justify piercing the corporate veil). 
244 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45–46 (stating that structuring ownership to give employ-
ees ownership opportunities creates incentives to make a business more successful). 
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tinuation features of all other business enterprises, including the 
corporation, the general partnership, and the limited liability com-
pany.  Allowing the sole proprietor’s business to continue after her 
death might lead to creative ways to address the estate tax problem 
that many small business owners and their families face,245 but an in 
depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
As with other business types, particularly the general partnership, 
the death of the owner should not automatically result in the termi-
nation of the business as well.  Consider RUPA’s approach to the is-
sue of “dissociation,” allowing the business the option to continue un-
interrupted following the death of a partner.246  The general 
partnership faces a unique dissociation problem with the death of 
one partner of a two-person partnership:  the general partnership 
would devolve into a sole proprietorship by default, because by defi-
nition a partnership must be owned by two or more persons.  While 
the issue of dissociation has recently been evaluated in LLC stat-
utes,247 it is an interesting issue, the deeper analysis of which is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
Analyzing the continuation issue of the sole proprietorship, an as-
sessment of corporation law might also add some valuable insights.  
Clearly, when it comes to a one-person corporation, the law has no 
problem with perpetual existence.248  If the law does not prohibit such 
perpetual existence for an incorporated proprietorship, there is no 
reason why the law should disallow it for the sole proprietorship. 
 
 
 
245 See John L. Ward, Growing the Family Business:  Special Challenges and Best Practices, 10 FAM. 
BUS. REV. 323, 330–34 (1997) (proposing practices to promote performance in light of 
specific challenges to the sole proprietorship).  See generally Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. 
Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310 
(2005) (taking a critical look at creditors’ rights relative to small business bankruptcies). 
246 See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 601–705 (1997) (describing the processes of dissociation and 
continuation, noting “a partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the occurrence of 
certain events. . . . (7) in the case of a partner who is an individual:  (i) the partner’s 
death” (§ 601) and that dissociation does not mean the automatic dissolution and liqui-
dation of the partnership, it may continue to operate pursuant to Article 7). 
247 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 601–704 (1996) (describing rights and the process of 
dissociation). 
248 See Carlos L. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778, 778 (1952) (stating that “under most statutes corporate existence 
is permitted to be perpetual”); Lawrence A. Schei, Comment, Corporations:  Statutory Re-
vival of Corporate Existence, 28 CAL. L. REV. 195, 195–202 (1940) (discussing California stat-
utes allowing corporations to extend terms of existence by altering the articles of incor-
poration). 
 
266 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
VII.  ENTITY EQUALITY TO REMEDY UNCONSCIOUS CLASSISM AGAINST 
SOLE PROPRIETORS 
The solitary alter ego view of the sole proprietorship handicaps 
sole proprietors and unconsciously relegates them to a legally disad-
vantaged status compared to their business association counterparts.  
A modern, remedial approach would recognize that a sole proprietor 
faces the same legal issues as owners of entity-granting business 
forms, especially when it comes to titling matters.  Therefore, appro-
priate legal reform would statutorily grant the sole proprietorship le-
gal entity status for titling purposes.  As constitutional law principles 
have not yet been applied to redress this form of unconscious clas-
sism, constitutional theory should be expanded to support entity 
equality between sole proprietors and other business owners.  To do 
so would promote principles of inherent fairness and would ensure 
the continued growth of and financial contributions made by small 
businesses, leading to the development of new applications of com-
mon law contract and tort law principles to sole proprietorship law.  
In summary, entity equality for the sole proprietor ensures the same 
mechanical efficiency that statutory authority currently provides 
other business owners, placing sole proprietors on a level playing 
field with partners, shareholders, and members. 
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APPENDIX A:  ENTITY FEATURES OF A SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP, 
CURRENTLY COMPARED TO PROPOSED CHANGES 
 
FEATURES CURRENTLY PROPOSED CHANGES 
Agency 
The sole proprietor is the sole 
agent of the business. 
The sole proprietor may assign 
authority to others to act as the 
sole proprietor’s agent for the 
business. 
Creation 
No statutory authority. No statutory compliance 
needed; statutory authority to 
define new normative features. 
Credit Reporting 
Sole proprietor’s credit is dir-
ectly affected by the business 
credit. 
Credit issued solely in the 
name of the business does not 
appear on the credit report of 
the sole proprietor. 
Criminal Law 
Criminal actions on behalf of 
the business are imputed to 
the sole proprietor. 
Criminal actions on the  
business’s behalf may be im-
puted to the business and not 
to its owner in some cases. 
Duration 
Dissolved at death, bank-
ruptcy, or termination. 
May be perpetual; transferable 
to surviving spouse (marital  
ex-emption from estate tax); 
may be put in trust. 
Entity 
Solitary alter ego, same as 
owner; treat business as iden-
tical to the sole proprietor. 
Legal entity for some purposes 
but not for all purposes,  
making it subject to benefits 
reserved to businesses, such as 
business rates for rental cars, 
insurance, credit cards, and 
airlines. 
Goodwill 
Sole proprietor does not likely 
benefit from business good-
will. 
As a separate entity with its own 
separate client base and  
accounting, business is more 
likely to establish goodwill. 
Liability 
Sole proprietor is directly sub-
ject to unlimited liability for 
the contracts, debts, and torts 
of the business. 
Sole proprietor still subject to 
unlimited liability for the  
contracts, debts, and torts of 
the business, but only after  
exhausting the business assets. 
Licensing  
Segregation 
Sole proprietor’s personal li-
censing and business licensing 
may not be separated. 
The sole proprietor’s personal 
licensing status, such as prac-
ticing law, may be separate 
from the business’s activities, 
such as public adjusting. 
Management 
The sole proprietor has com-
plete management authority 
and control. 
The sole proprietor may appoint 
management authority to an-
other person, subject to final 
authority and control exercised 
by the sole proprietor. 
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FEATURES CURRENTLY PROPOSED CHANGES 
Name 
Sole proprietor may adopt a 
fictitious or assumed name, 
subject to registration  
requirements. 
A sole proprietor may adopt a 
separate business fictitious or 
assumed name, which may be 
registered and may include the 
term “sole proprietorship” or 
“s.p.” designation. 
Privacy 
Sole proprietor’s business  
activities are of record and go 
to the personal reputation of 
the sole proprietor. 
Sole proprietor’s business  
activities may not be reflected 
in the personal name of the 
sole proprietor.  Separate entity 
may protect sole proprietor 
from identity fraud. 
Suits 
In an action brought by or 
against the sole proprietor-
ship, the sole proprietor is the 
sole and necessary party. 
The sole proprietorship may 
sue or be sued in its own name. 
Taxation 
Sole proprietor may obtain 
separate TIN/EIN and may 
offset business expenses  
beyond itemized deductions. 
Sole proprietor should obtain 
separate TIN/EIN and should 
file Schedule C to offset  
business expenses. 
Title of Property 
All business property must be 
titled in the name of the sole 
proprietor. 
All business property must be 
titled under business name, 
promoting ease of  
transferability. 
Transferability 
Interest of the sole proprietor 
may not be assigned. 
Interest of the sole proprietor 
may be assigned; but the  
assignee does not become the 
sole proprietor. 
Trust  
Treatment/ 
Estate Planning 
Sole proprietorship cannot be 
the subject of a trust. 
Sole proprietorship can be 
placed into a trust, providing 
potential creditor protection, 
estate planning benefits. 
 
APPENDIX B:  UNIFORM SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP ACT (“USPA”) 
The following proposes the legal entity status features of a model 
sole proprietorship statute, the Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act 
(“USPA”).  It follows the example of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ (“NCCUSL”) treatment of 
the general partnership as a legal entity, rather than as an aggregate 
of partners.  The USPA is based, in part on the Uniform Partnership 
Act (1914)249 and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994).250 
 
249 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914). 
250 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997). 
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§ 1.  Sole Proprietorship Defined 
(1) A sole proprietorship is an unincorporated or non-LLC busi-
ness entity owned by one person, the sole proprietor or owner, for 
the purpose of making a profit. 
(2) A sole proprietorship is distinguished from other one-person 
legal entities, including a one-owner corporation or a one-owner lim-
ited liability company. 
§ 2.  Rules for Determining the Existence of a Sole Proprietorship 
In determining whether a sole proprietorship exists, these rules 
shall apply: 
(1) A person solely operating a business for profit may be legally 
found to be a sole proprietorship, pursuant to the terms of this stat-
ute. 
(2) A person solely owning a business for profit, in association 
with family members may still be found to be a sole proprietorship. 
(3) Owning property in another legal entity such as an LLC does 
not in itself negate the existence of a sole proprietorship. 
§ 3.  Creation of a Sole Proprietorship 
(1) A sole proprietorship results from the operation of an unin-
corporated or non-LLC business for profit that is owned by one per-
son, whether or not the operator intends to create a sole proprietor-
ship.  Its existence does not require compliance with an enabling 
statute.  Its operation should also comply with other statutes such as 
licensing, permits, safety, taxation, and zoning, but its existence as a 
sole proprietorship does not require such compliance. 
(2) By operation of law, a failed attempt either to create a one-
person limited liability company or to create a one-person corpora-
tion results in the creation of a sole proprietorship. 
(3) By operation of law, the sole surviving partner of a duly cre-
ated partnership who rightfully or wrongfully continues the business 
of the former partnership operates the business as a sole proprietor, 
unless a new partnership is formed through the election of an addi-
tional partner(s). 
§ 4.  Sole Proprietorship Property 
(1) Sole proprietorship property shall include but not be limited 
to all property originally brought into the sole proprietorship, stock, 
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or property subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise, on ac-
count of the sole proprietorship. 
(2) Unless the contrary intention is manifested at the time of ac-
quisition, property acquired with sole proprietorship funds is sole 
proprietorship property. 
(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired in the sole pro-
prietorship name or in an assumed or fictitious name.  Title so ac-
quired can be conveyed only in the sole proprietorship name. 
(4) A conveyance to a sole proprietorship in the sole proprietor-
ship name, though without words of inheritance, passes the entire 
sole proprietorship interest of the grantor unless a contrary intent 
appears. 
§ 5.  The Sole Proprietor is an Agent of the Sole Proprietorship as to the Sole 
Proprietorship Business 
(1) The sole proprietor is an agent of the sole proprietorship for 
the purposes of its business, and the act of the sole proprietor, in-
cluding the execution in the sole proprietorship name of any instru-
ment, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the 
sole proprietorship binds the sole proprietorship, unless the sole 
proprietor so acting has in fact no authority to act for the sole pro-
prietorship in the particular matter, and the person with whom she is 
dealing has knowledge of the fact that she has no such authority.  
When executing a contract on behalf of the sole proprietorship, a 
sole proprietor identifies when she is acting in representative capacity 
by using the designation “owner” or “proprietor” following her signa-
ture.  Failure to do so results in direct personal liability. 
(2) An act of the sole proprietor which is not apparently for the 
carrying on of the business of the sole proprietorship in the usual way 
does not bind the sole proprietorship. 
(3) Unless clearly contrary to the terms of the sole proprietorship, 
the sole proprietor shall have the authority to: 
(a) Assign the sole proprietorship property in trust for credi-
tors or on the assignee’s promise to pay the debts of the sole pro-
prietorship, 
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business, 
(c) Do any other act which would make it possible to carry on 
the ordinary business of the sole proprietorship, 
(d) Confess a judgment, or 
(e) Submit a sole proprietorship claim or liability to arbitration 
or reference. 
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(4) No act of a sole proprietor in contravention of a restriction on 
authority shall bind the sole proprietorship to persons having knowl-
edge of the restriction. 
§ 6.  Conveyance of Real Property of the Sole Proprietorship 
(1) Where title to real property is in the sole proprietorship name, 
the sole proprietor may convey title to such property by a conveyance 
executed in the sole proprietorship name and shall pass both the le-
gal interest of the sole proprietorship and the equitable interest of 
the sole proprietor. 
(2) Where title to sole proprietorship real property is in the name 
of the sole proprietor, and the record does not disclose the right of 
the sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor may convey title to such 
property. 
(3) These provisions are not intended to change any existing op-
eration of state or federal law relative to rule of property law, spousal 
rights, or marital interests. 
§ 7.  Sole Proprietorship Bound by Sole Proprietor’s Wrongful Acts 
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of the sole proprietor act-
ing in the ordinary course of the business of the sole proprietorship, 
loss or injury is caused to any person, or any penalty is incurred, the 
sole proprietorship is liable therefore to the same extent as the sole 
proprietor so acting or omitting to act. 
§ 8.  Sole Proprietorship Bound by Sole Proprietor’s Breach of Trust 
The sole proprietorship is bound to make good the loss: 
(a) Where the sole proprietor acting within the scope of her ac-
tual or apparent authority receives money or property of a third per-
son and misapplies it; and 
(b) Where the sole proprietorship in the course of its business re-
ceives money or property of a third person and the money or prop-
erty so received is misapplied by the sole proprietor or any agent of 
the sole proprietor while it is in the custody of the sole proprietor-
ship. 
§ 9.  Nature of Sole Proprietor’s Liability 
The sole proprietor is liable: 
(a) Personally for everything chargeable to the sole proprietorship 
under sections 13 and 14. 
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(b) Personally for all other debts and obligations of the sole pro-
prietorship. 
§ 10.  Rules Determining the Rights and Duties Between the Sole Proprietor 
and the Sole Proprietorship 
The duties and rights of the sole proprietor in relation to the sole 
proprietorship shall be determined, subject to any agreement be-
tween them, by the following rules: 
(a) The sole proprietor shall be repaid her contributions, whether 
by way of capital or advances to the sole proprietorship property, and 
share totally in the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, 
including those to creditors, are satisfied; and must contribute totally 
towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the 
sole proprietorship. 
(b) The sole proprietorship must indemnify the sole proprietor in 
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably in-
curred by her in the ordinary and property conduct of its business, or 
for the preservation of its business or property. 
§ 11.  Sole Proprietorship Books. 
The sole proprietorship books shall be kept, subject to any 
agreement between the sole proprietor and the sole proprietorship, 
at the principal place of business of the sole proprietorship, and the 
sole proprietor shall at all times have access to and may inspect and 
copy them. 
§ 12.  Sole Proprietor as a Fiduciary 
The sole proprietor must account to the sole proprietorship for 
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by her from 
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquida-
tion of the sole proprietorship or from any use by her of its property. 
§ 13.  Right to an Account 
A sole proprietor shall have the right to a formal account as to 
sole proprietorship affairs. 
§ 14.  Continuation of Sole Proprietorship Beyond Fixed Term 
(1) When a sole proprietorship for a fixed term or particular un-
dertaking is continued after the termination of such term or particu-
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lar undertaking without any express agreement, the rights and duties 
of the sole proprietor remains the same as they were at such termina-
tion, so far as is consistent with a sole proprietorship at will. 
(2) A continuation of the business by the sole proprietor as ha-
bitually acted therein during the term, without any settlement or liq-
uidation of the sole proprietorship’s affairs, is prima facie evidence of 
a continuation of the sole proprietorship. 
§ 15.  Extent of Property Rights of a Sole Proprietor 
The property rights of sole proprietor are (1) her rights in specific 
sole proprietorship property, (2) her interest in the sole proprietor-
ship, and (3) her right to total control in the management of the sole 
proprietorship, subject to creditors’ rights. 
§ 16.  Nature of a Sole Proprietor’s Right in Specific Sole Proprietorship 
Property 
(a) A sole proprietor is the sole owner of specific sole proprietor-
ship property holding as an “owner in sole proprietorship.” 
(b) A sole proprietor’s right to specific sole proprietorship prop-
erty is assignable. 
(c) A sole proprietor interest in specific sole proprietorship prop-
erty is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim 
against the sole proprietorship. 
(d) When sole proprietorship property is attached for a sole pro-
prietorship debt, the sole proprietor cannot claim any right under 
the homestead or exemption laws. 
(e) On the death of the sole proprietor, her right in specific sole 
proprietorship property vests in her legal representative. 
§ 17.  Nature of a Partner’s Interest in the Sole Proprietorship 
A sole proprietor’s interest in the sole proprietorship is her total 
share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property. 
§ 18.  Assignment of a Sole Proprietor’s Interest; Conveyance of the Business 
(1) A conveyance by a sole proprietor of her interest in the sole 
proprietorship does not of itself dissolve the sole proprietorship, nor, 
entitle the assignee, during the continuation of the sole proprietor-
ship, to interfere in the management or administration of the sole 
proprietorship business or affairs, or require any information or ac-
count of sole proprietorship transactions, or to inspect the sole pro-
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prietorship books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in ac-
cordance with her contract the profits to which the sole proprietor 
would otherwise be entitled. 
(2) In order for a sole proprietor to sell or convey the sole pro-
prietorship, the sole proprietor must sell or convey the entire sole 
proprietorship including its assets (property), interests, and all rights 
thereto. 
§ 19.  Sole Proprietor’s Interest Subject to a Charging Order 
On due application to a competent court by any judgment credi-
tor of the sole proprietor, the court which entered the judgment, or-
der, or decree, or any other court, may charge the interest of the 
debtor sole proprietor with payment of the unsatisfied amount of 
such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may then or later ap-
point a receiver of her share of the profits, and or any other money 
due or to fall due to her in respect of the sole proprietorship, and 
make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries which the 
debtor sole proprietor might have made, or which the circumstances 
of the case may require. 
§ 20.  Dissolution Following the Death of the Sole Proprietor 
(1) Upon the death of the sole proprietor, the sole proprietorship 
shall terminate.  The property of the sole proprietorship shall auto-
matically become the property of the sole proprietor’s estate, subject 
to creditors’ rights. 
(2) If the sole proprietorship is created for a purpose, or term, the 
death of the sole proprietor will not terminate the sole proprietor-
ship so long as the continuation of the sole proprietorship has been 
anticipated and agreed to by the sole proprietor.  The sole proprietor 
may make provisions for the management of the sole proprietorship 
upon her death. 
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APPENDIX C:  DISTRIBUTION OF SOLE PROPRIETORS AND THEIR GROSS 
RECEIPTS BY SIZE OF PROPRIETORSHIP, TAX YEAR 2003251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
251 Chart from U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP:  A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING 
THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
5 (2007). 
